# Cursus Theologicus (*Theological Course*)

**by João Poinsot (Ioannis A S. Thoma, John of St. Thomas), 1640**

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## Question 1, Disputation 7, Article 2 (Q. 1, D. 7, A. 2)

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| *Latin* |  | *English* |
| ARTICULUS II. |  | **ARTICLE II.** |
| *Utrum facta legitima electione pontificis sit de fide per se primo, vel per se secundo hanc personam in particulari, verbi gratia Innocentium X, esse papam?* |  | ***Whether, after a legitimate election of a pontiff, it is of faith per se primo, or per se secundo that this particular person, for example Innocent X, is pope?*** |
| I. Quaestio haec valde celebris facta est his temporibus, variisque argumentis agitata, nam de ea apud veteres pauca reperiuntur in terminis, quibus modo disputatur: antequam vero ea quae difficultatem in hac parte faciunt proponamus, explicandi sunt duo termini, qui in titulo proponuntur, aut supponuntur. Primus est ly facta legitima electione: secundus ly de fide per se primo, aut per se secundo. Et quoad primum supponimus posse dari electionem pontificis non legitimam, sed dubiam, aut vitiosam, non solum si fiat a non legitimis electoribus, id est, a personis, quibus jus eligendi datum non est ab Ecclesia, vel pontifice; nam tunc non est dubium electionem non esse, sed violentam extorsionem; sed etiamsi a legitimis electoribus fiat, id est, a cardinalibus, quibus haec potestas nunc in Ecclesia commissa est. In quo tamen nonnulla difficultas esse potest, an electio celebrata a cardinalibus possit vitiari, nam in primis ex parte eligentium vitiari non potest, quia cardinales nulla censura impediri possunt a jure eligendi. Hoc enim est singulare privilegium electionis summi pontificis, ut expresse habetur in clementina Ne Romani §. Caeterum de electione, ubi decernitur nullum cardinalium praetextu excommunicationis, vel censurae posse ab electione illa repelli, quod factum est ut evitarentur schismata, et incertitudo electionis, a qua pendet totius Ecclesiae directio, et gubernatio, unde hoc ipso quod cardinales intersunt electioni invalidari non potest ex parte eligentium: deinde neque ex parte ipsius electionis vitiari potest, aut dubia reddi propter assistentiam Spiritus sancti in illa electione facienda; hanc enim dari multi probabiliter existimant, et praesertim comprobatur ex testimonio quodam Sixti V, in constitutione L, ubi agit de cardinalibus, et inter alia inquit: “Quod in illa sacra electione censendi sunt veri interpretes, atque internuntii voluntatis divinae, cujus Spiritu sicut universum Ecclesiae corpus sanctificatur, et regitur, ita maxime hoc totum ejusmodi electionis opus ejusdem afflatu, et instinctu absolvi certissimum est, atque omnibus exploratum.» Ubi pontifex aliquam peculiarem assistentiam Spiritus sancti tribuit electioni illi, quae non tribuitur aliis operibus, seu actionibus communibus, comparatur enim haec assistentia illi, qua corpus Ecclesiae regitur, et sanctificatur a Spiritu, sed ex hac assistentia constat Ecclesiam errare non posse; ergo ex eadem tenere debemus electionem a cardinalibus factam errare non posse, aut invalida reddi, alias in illa non habet specialem assistentiam si aliquando errat, et deficit, aliquando non, id enim in quacumque alia actione invenitur. |  | **I.** This question has become very celebrated in these times, and has been discussed with various arguments, for little can be found among the ancients in the exact terms in which it is now disputed. Before we propose those matters which create difficulty in this area, two terms must be explained which are proposed or presupposed in the title. The first is the phrase “given a legitimate election”; the second is the phrase “of faith per se primo, or per se secundo.” And as to the first, we suppose that a papal election can be not legitimate, but doubtful or flawed, not only if it is conducted by illegitimate electors, that is, by persons to whom the right of electing has not been given by the Church or the Pope (for then there is no doubt that it is not an election but a violent usurpation), but even if it is conducted by legitimate electors, that is, by the Cardinals, to whom this power is now entrusted in the Church. Concerning this, however, there may be some difficulty as to whether an election celebrated by Cardinals can be vitiated. For, first, it cannot be vitiated on the part of the electors, because Cardinals cannot be impeded from the right of election by any censure. This is a singular privilege of the election of the Supreme Pontiff, as is expressly stated in the Clementine [Constitution] Ne Romani §. Caeterum de electione, where it is decreed that no Cardinal can be repelled from that election on the pretext of excommunication or censure. This was established to avoid schisms and uncertainty of election, upon which depends the direction and governance of the entire Church. Therefore, by the very fact that Cardinals participate in the election, it cannot be invalidated on the part of the electors. Furthermore, neither can it be vitiated on the part of the election itself nor rendered doubtful, on account of the assistance of the Holy Spirit in conducting that election. For many consider this assistance to be given with probability, and it is especially confirmed by a certain testimony of Sixtus V in Constitution L, where, treating of Cardinals, he says among other things: “That in that sacred election they are to be considered true interpreters and mediators of the divine will, by whose Spirit, just as the entire body of the Church is sanctified and governed, so most certainly it is entirely certain and clear to all that this whole work of such an election is completed by His inspiration and instinct.” Here the Pontiff attributes a certain special assistance of the Holy Spirit to that election, which is not attributed to other works or common actions, for this assistance is compared to that by which the body of the Church is governed and sanctified by the Spirit. But from this assistance, it is established that the Church cannot err; therefore, from the same [assistance], we must hold that an election made by Cardinals cannot err or be rendered invalid. Otherwise, it would not have special assistance if it sometimes errs and fails, and sometimes does not, for that is found in any other action. |
| II. Nihilominus dicendum est posse multis de causis electionem reddi vitiosam, aut dubiam quantumque a legitimis electoribus fiat, idque tum ex parte ipsius electionis, tum ex parte personae electae juxta defectus, quos ipsa jura assignant, ex parte quidem electionis, ut fiat per metum cadentem in constantem virum electio illa est nulla, ut determinatur sessione XXXIX Concilii Constantiensis: et similiter si non servetur forma quae ponitur in capite Ubi periculum de electione in sexto, ut scilicet a duabus partibus cardinalium sit electus: similiter si per simoniam eligatur, electio est nulla, ut habetur in constitutione Julii II, quae incipit: Cum tam divino, anno 1505. Potest etiam contra personam electam opponi exceptio haeresis, ut sit haereticus manifestus, qui eligitur, non est habendus pro pontifice, ut constat ex eadem constitutione Julii II, et similiter aliae exceptiones juris naturalis admitti possunt, ut si non esset vir, si esset judicio privatus, etc. Alia vero quae olim opponi poterant contra electionem pontificis, ut quod esset facta per violentiam, fraudem aut ambitionem juxta caput In nomine, distinctione XXIII, opponi non possunt modo contra electum a duabus partibus cardinalium, quia contra ipsum nulla exceptio hujusmodi admittitur, juxta caput Ubi periculum citato, exceptis his quæ ex constitutione Julii II, aut jure naturali incapacitatis possunt opponi. Denique Concilium Constantiense determinat quod judicare de electione dubia ad ipsum Concilium spectat; ergo supponit posse dari electionem dubiam, aut vitiosam de qua judicare possit. |  | **II.** Nevertheless, it must be said that an election can be rendered flawed or doubtful for many reasons, even if it is conducted by legitimate electors, and this can occur both in the election process itself and with respect to the person elected, according to the defects which the laws themselves specify. Regarding the election process, if it is conducted under fear sufficient to influence a steadfast man, that election is null, as determined in Session XXXIX of the Council of Constance. Similarly, if the form established in the chapter “Ubi periculum” on election in the Sixth [Book of Decretals] is not observed, namely that the person must be elected by two-thirds of the Cardinals. Likewise, if someone is elected through simony, the election is null, as stated in the constitution of Julius II which begins “Cum tam divino,” issued in 1505. An objection of heresy can also be raised against the person elected; if the one elected is a manifest heretic, he is not to be considered as pontiff, as is established in the same constitution of Julius II. Similarly, other exceptions based on natural law can be admitted, such as if the person were not a man, or if he were deprived of judgment, etc. However, other objections that once could be raised against a papal election, such as that it was conducted through violence, fraud, or ambition, according to the chapter “In nomine,” distinction XXIII, cannot now be raised against someone elected by two-thirds of the Cardinals, because no exception of this kind is admitted against him, according to the aforementioned chapter “Ubi periculum,” except those that can be raised based on the constitution of Julius II or on the natural law of incapacity. Finally, the Council of Constance determined that judging a doubtful election pertains to the Council itself; therefore, it supposes that a doubtful or flawed election can occur, which it may judge. |
| III. Quare ad rationem allatam respondeo, quod licet ex parte personarum eligentium non possit illis opponi aliqua censura, possunt tamen opponi alii defectus, ut si opponatur quod non sit vere facta a duabus partibus cardinalium, hoc enim requiritur ex capite Licet de electione, aut si opponatur aliquos ex illis duabus partibus vere non esse cardinales, ut ex abbate in dicto capite docet Azorius libro IV, cap. v, quæst. VII, §. Quoties insuper; et similiter si aliqui non sint ordinati eo ordine cujus tituli cardinales sunt ut diaconus cardinalis sit diaconus, presbyter cardinalis sacerdos, etc. ex quadam constitutione Gregorii XIII, ac demum si metu cadente in constantem virum aliqui eligant, ut ex Concilio Constantiensi diximus. Unde non valet, inhabilitas censuræ non potest illi opponi, ergo nec aliæ inhabilitates, quæ a jure positæ sunt. |  | **III.** Therefore, to the reason put forward, I respond that although no censure can be opposed against the electing persons themselves, other defects can nonetheless be raised, such as if it is objected that the election was not truly made by two-thirds of the Cardinals, for this is required by the chapter “Licet” on election; or if it is objected that some of those two-thirds are not truly Cardinals, as Azorius teaches from the Abbot in the said chapter, in Book IV, chapter V, question VII, §. “Quoties insuper”; and similarly if some are not ordained in the order whose title of Cardinal they hold, such as a Cardinal Deacon being a deacon, a Cardinal Priest being a priest, etc., according to a certain constitution of Gregory XIII; and finally if some elect out of fear that would affect a steadfast man, as we have stated from the Council of Constance. Hence the argument does not hold: “The disqualification of censure cannot be opposed to him, therefore neither can other disqualifications which are established by law.” |
| IV. Ad id vero, quod opponitur ex parte assistentiæ Spiritus sancti in electione pontificis respondetur, pontificem non dicere quod electioni illi est semper debita infallibilis assistentia Spiritus sancti, ita ut nunquam errare possint electores; cum ex supra citatis juribus oppositum colligatur, sed dicit opus electionis absolvi instinctu Spiritus sancti, id est, quando consummatur talis electio, et pacifice conficitur; quamdiu enim dubia est, non absolvitur, sed adhuc aliquid restat: tunc ergo quando absolvitur ex instinctu Spiritus sancti fit, id est, ex speciali ejus providentia, et auxilio quo illud electionis opus gubernat, eo modo quo Ecclesiam specialiter regit: multa enim sunt quæ ex speciali Dei providentia, et assistentia Spiritus sancti ordinantur, aut fiunt, et tamen non habent infallibilem indeficientiam ut semper tale auxilium detur, ita ut illo nunquam careant, sed concorditer eligant, et debite, cum de hoc nulla sit facta promissio. Neque etiam Sixtus in illis verbis definitive procedit, sed narrative ad tollendam cardinalium dignitatem, ut ex textu patet. Igitur quæstio præsens non procedit de certitudine qua creditur hanc personam esse pontificem absolute, et quacumque electione facta, sed legitima electione supposita, sine qua non potest cadere sub fidem hunc esse pontificem, nec est inconveniens aliquid cadere sub fidem ex suppositione aliqua tamquam conditione requisita, sicut ut aliquid definiatur de fide necesse est, quod præcedat disputatio, et conquisitio, sicut factum fuit in Concilio Apostolorum, Actorum xv, et tamen ipsa conquisitio, et disputatio non pertinet ad fidem sed supponitur præcessisse tamquam conditio. |  | **IV.** To that which is objected concerning the assistance of the Holy Spirit in the election of the pontiff, it is answered that the pontiff does not say that infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit is always due to that election, such that the electors can never err; since from the laws cited above, the opposite is inferred. Rather, he says that the work of election is completed by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, that is, when such an election is consummated and peacefully accomplished. For as long as it remains doubtful, it is not completed, but something still remains unresolved. Therefore, when it is completed, it happens by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, that is, by His special providence and assistance by which He governs that work of election, in the manner by which He specially rules the Church. For there are many things which are ordained or done by the special providence of God and assistance of the Holy Spirit, and yet they do not have infallible indefectibility such that such assistance is always given, ensuring they never lack it, but rather that they elect concordantly and properly, since no promise has been made concerning this. Nor does Sixtus proceed definitively in those words, but narratively to uphold the dignity of the cardinals, as is evident from the text. Therefore, the present question does not proceed from the certainty by which this person is believed to be the pontiff absolutely and by any election whatsoever, but presupposes a legitimate election, without which it cannot fall under faith that this person is the pontiff. Nor is it inappropriate for something to fall under faith based on a certain supposition as a required condition, just as for something to be defined as a matter of faith, it is necessary that disputation and investigation precede it, as was done in the Council of the Apostles, Acts 15, and yet this investigation and disputation does not pertain to faith but is presumed to have preceded as a condition. |
| V. Secundus terminus explicandus in titulo est ly per se primo, vel per se secundo de fide, quod aliis terminis solet dici quod aliquid sit de fide immediate et formaliter, et mediate seu virtualiter, et illud dicitur immediate et per se primo de fide, quod lumine Dei et per assensum credendi immediate attingitur tamquam immediate revelatum, illud autem dicitur mediate et per se secundo attingi, quod ex propositione de fide per illationem attingitur, et sic pertinet ad lumen theologicum, quod est illativum ex his quæ sunt de fide. Itaque per se primo de fide, vel per se secundo differunt sicut principia et conclusiones in scientiis. Adhuc tamen inter ipsas veritates, quæ non mediate, sed immediate pertinent ad lumen fidei, et sunt revelata, est quædam differentia, et graduatio, quod quædam sunt de fide quoad se tantum, alia quoad se, quoad nos, et in istis quædam sunt de fide quoad omnes, quædam quoad sapientes tantum, vel quoad aliquos. Quoad se tantum est de fide illud quod est quidem de facto revelatum, et contentum in sacris litteris, vel traditione Ecclesiæ, non tamen est de facto propositum ab Ecclesia, ut quod: Gratia sit qualitas, seu habitus: quod: Gratia Dei independens sit inefficacia ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ex natura sua, ut descendit a Deo efficax sit: quod: Deus prædefiniat omnes actus liberos in particulari ante omnem prævisionem futuritionis eorum, etiam condionatam, et similes aliæ propositiones, quæ nondum ab Ecclesia explicatæ sunt, et tales coincidunt modo cum conclusionibus theologicis, omnia enim quæ Ecclesia definit, cum ex præsupposita disputatione definiat, prius sunt conclusiones illatæ theologicæ per disputationem, quam definita de fide. Et ideo est peculiare in theologia, quod ea quæ aliquando sunt conclusiones, possunt fieri principia. Quoad nos autem sunt de fide, quæcumque de facto revelata sunt ab Ecclesia proposita, vel per definitionem suam, vel quia expresse sunt contenta in sacris litteris: cæterum in his quæ quoad nos sunt de fide, quædam sunt de fide quoad omnes, quædam quoad aliquos, seu quoad sapientes, cujus differentiæ ratio oritur ex eo, quod ipsa definitio, seu revelatio propositionum per quam pertinent ad fidem aliquando ita est expressa, ut sine controversia aliqua apud omnes habeatur, ut quod : Deus est trinus et unus ; aliquando vero cadit sub opinione, aut dubio, an sit definita seu revelata, an non. Et ideo possunt aliquando esse opiniones circa censuram alicujus propositionis, an sit erronea, vel non, quia quantumcumque propositio illa sit revelata, aut definita, non omnino constat apud omnes de ejus definitione, et ideo in aliquibus propositionibus contingit non solum ipsas esse de fide, sed etiam reflexas earum, ut quod illæ sint de fide, esse etiam de fide ; sicut incarnatio Christi, et Trinitas Personarum, ita sunt de fide, quod etiam de fide est eas esse de fide. Aliquando vero propositiones ipsæ de fide sunt, non tamen reflexa earum est de fide, quia adhuc manet aliqua controversia circa earum definitionem, aut an sint contenta in sacris litteris, vel traditione, et acceptatione Ecclesiæ, et sic in præsenti controvertimus an sit de fide hanc determinatam personam quæ legitime electa est esse pontificem et caput Ecclesiæ, vel quo gradu certitudinis id tenendum sit. |  | **V.** The second term to be explained in the title is “per se primo” or “per se secundo” of faith, which in other terms is commonly expressed as something being “immediately and formally” of faith, or “mediately and virtually” of faith. That which is said to be “immediately” and “per se primo” of faith is what is directly apprehended by the light of God and through the assent of believing as something immediately revealed. That which is said to be apprehended “mediately” and “per se secundo” is what is reached through inference from a proposition of faith, and thus pertains to theological reasoning, which draws conclusions from matters of faith. Therefore, “per se primo” of faith and “per se secundo” differ as principles and conclusions do in the sciences. Nevertheless, even among those truths which pertain not mediately but immediately to the light of faith and are revealed, there is a certain difference and gradation: some are of faith only in themselves, others both in themselves and for us. And among these latter, some are of faith for all people, others only for the learned, or for certain individuals. Something is of faith “in itself only” when it is indeed actually revealed and contained in Sacred Scripture or in the tradition of the Church, yet has not actually been proposed by the Church as such—for example, that Grace is a quality or habit; that the Grace of God is independent in its efficacy from any extrinsic factor, but is efficacious by its own nature as it descends from God; that God predetermines all free acts in particular before any foresight of their future occurrence, even conditional foresight; and similar other propositions which have not yet been explicitly explained by the Church. Such propositions coincide at present with theological conclusions, for everything the Church defines, since she defines it following prior disputation, are first theological conclusions drawn through disputation before they become defined matters of faith. And this is peculiar to theology, that what are at one time conclusions can later become principles. Things are of faith “for us” when they have been actually revealed and proposed by the Church, either through her definition or because they are expressly contained in Sacred Scripture. However, among those things that are of faith for us, some are of faith for all people, while others only for some, or for the learned. The reason for this difference arises from the fact that the definition itself or the revelation of propositions by which they pertain to faith is sometimes so explicit that it is held without any controversy among all—for example, that God is triune and one. At other times, however, it falls under opinion or doubt whether it has been defined or revealed or not. And therefore, there can sometimes be opinions about the censure of a certain proposition, whether it is erroneous or not, because however much that proposition may be revealed or defined, its definition is not entirely established among everyone. And thus, regarding some propositions, it happens that not only are they themselves of faith, but also reflective statements about them—that they are of faith—are also of faith. Just as the Incarnation of Christ and the Trinity of Persons are so much of faith that it is also of faith that they are of faith. On the other hand, sometimes propositions themselves are of faith, but reflective statements about them are not of faith, because there still remains some controversy about their definition, or whether they are contained in Sacred Scripture or in the tradition and acceptance of the Church. Thus, in the present case, we debate whether it is of faith that this specific person who has been legitimately elected is the pontiff and head of the Church, or with what degree of certainty this should be held. |
| VI. In hac difficultate quidam theologi nostris temporibus existimarunt nullo modo pertinere ad fidem, nec per se primo, nec per se secundo aliquem hominem in particulari post D. Petrum fuisse papam, sed teneri quadam morali certitudine, aut naturali evidentia, seu experientia qua tales homines in sede Petri Ecclesiam gubernare videmus, et ut rite electos ab Ecclesia acceptari. Atque ita licet qui negaret hunc hominem esse papam, esset schismaticus, tamen qui negaret, non esse de fide quod hic homo sit papa, non esset schismaticus, sed probabiliter id sentiret. Pro hac conclusione citat magistrum Nugno II tomo, quæst. xx, articulo III, dub. I, plures ex recentioribus suppresso nomine, quos dicit nondum sua scripta evulgasse. At vero pater Suarez in tomo de fide, disputatione x, sectione v, plures citat ex Thomistis, et ex antiquis auctoribus pro ista sententia, scilicet Turrecremata lib. IV summæ, parte II, capite IX circa finem; Cajetanum 2-2, quæstione I, articulo III, in responsione ad quartum, magistrum Bagnez 2-2, quæst. I, articulo x in prioribus commentariis, dub. II ad secundum; Cano lib. VI de locis, capite ultimo; Castro lib. I adversus hæreses, cap. VIII circa medium; Albertinum, Cordubam, et alios, qui auctores, inquit Suarez, tenent non esse de fide immediate hunc hominem in particulari esse papam, sed morali quadam certitudine id teneri. Ego vero Albertinum, et Cordubam non vidi, de reliquis vero hoc formo judicium, quod Castro aperte tenet hanc sententiam, ejus enim verba explicationem non patiuntur dum dicit: « Quamvis credere teneantur ex fide, verum Christi successorem esse supremum totius Ecclesiæ pastorem, non tamen tenemur eadem fide credere Leonem, aut Clementem esse verum Petri successorem, quia non tenemur ex fide catholica credere eorum quemlibet recte, et canonice fuisse electum: » unde concludit, quod qui hoc negaret, non esset dicendus hæreticus, sed schismaticus. Magister Cano in id satis inclinat, et dicit, quod licet de fide sint Concilia legitime congregata esse certissimæ veritatis, tamen quod legitime sit congregatum hoc vel illud Concilium sola certitudine naturali creditur: et similiter quod ex evangelio habetur successorem Petri habere ejus ordinariam potestatem; quod vero ille, quem Christus Petro mortuo suffecit Romanus fuerit episcopus e re gesta colligitur. Sic magister Cano. |  | **VI.** Regarding this difficulty, certain theologians in our times have held that it does not pertain to the faith, either primarily or secondarily, that any particular man after St. Peter was pope, but rather this is held with a kind of moral certainty, or natural evidence, or experience by which we see such men governing the Church in the seat of Peter and being accepted by the Church as duly elected. And thus, although one who denied that this man is pope would be schismatic, nevertheless one who denied that it is a matter of faith that this man is pope would not be schismatic, but would be holding a probable opinion. For this conclusion, he cites Master Nuño in the second volume, question 20, article 3, doubt 1, and several more recent authors without naming them, whom he says have not yet published their writings. However, Father Suárez, in his volume on faith, disputation 10, section 5, cites several Thomists and ancient authors for this position, namely: Torquemada in book 4 of the Summa, part 2, chapter 9 near the end; Cajetan in 2-2, question 1, article 3, in response to the fourth objection; Master Bañez in 2-2, question 1, article 10 in his earlier commentaries, doubt 2 to the second objection; Cano in book 6 on theological loci, final chapter; Castro in book 1 against heresies, chapter 8 around the middle; Albertini, Córdoba, and others. These authors, says Suárez, hold that it is not immediately a matter of faith that this particular man is pope, but rather this is held with a kind of moral certainty. I myself have not seen Albertini and Córdoba, but regarding the others I form this judgment: that Castro clearly holds this position, for his words do not admit explanation when he says: “Although they are bound to believe by faith that the true successor of Christ is the supreme pastor of the whole Church, nevertheless we are not bound by the same faith to believe that Leo or Clement is the true successor of Peter, because we are not bound by Catholic faith to believe that any of them was correctly and canonically elected.” From which he concludes that one who denied this would not be called a heretic, but a schismatic. Master Cano inclines sufficiently to this view and says that although it is a matter of faith that Councils legitimately convened are of the most certain truth, nevertheless that this or that Council is legitimately convened is believed only with natural certainty; and similarly, that from the Gospel we have that the successor of Peter possesses his ordinary power, but that the one whom Christ appointed after Peter’s death was the Roman bishop is gathered from historical fact. Thus says Master Cano. |
| VII. Quod vero attinet ad magistrum Bagnez videtur plane indicare istam sententiam, eamque tenere, dum citato loco, §. Verumtamen dicit, quod hunc hominem esse summum pontificem pendet ex quibusdam circumstantiis, quæ deficere possunt, ut quod sit baptizatus, et fortasse non est baptizatus, et tandem concludit, quod esset valde temerarium, et scandalosum si postquam acceptavit Ecclesia aliquem, ut summum pontificem negaret illum esse summum pontificem verum, nisi ostenderet illum non esse baptizatum, aut non esse virum, alioquin non solum ut vehementer suspectus de hæresi, sed ut hæreticus merito puniretur. Ubi magister Bagnez non audet simpliciter condemnare ut hæresim, et contra fidem oppositum illius propositionis, videturque admittere, non esse impossibile ostendere, quod ille homo non sit baptizatus. Cajetanus citato loco dicit, nos adorare summum pontificem, non sub conditione an sit baptizatus sed absolute, et tamen inquit: « Quis scit si ille fuit baptizatus? » Ubi saltem hanc circumstantiam non haberi per fidem videtur fateri. Denique Turrecremata citato loco dicit, quod illa veritas, quod hic homo sit summus pontifex est sapiens veritatem catholicam, adjuncta autem una propositione naturaliter nota scilicet, quod iste est electus pacifice, efficitur veritas catholica: et ideo in Concilio Constantiensi determinatur, ut interrogandus de fide interrogetur an credat hunc hominem canonice electum esse verum Petri successorem. Ubi Turrecremata non simpliciter negat esse de fide, quod hic homo sit pontifex, sed inquit, id haberi de fide supposita quadam veritate naturaliter nota, scilicet quod sit electus rite. |  | **VII.** As for what concerns Master Bagnez, he seems clearly to indicate and hold this opinion when, in the cited passage, §. Verumtamen, he says that this man being the Supreme Pontiff depends on certain circumstances which may be lacking, such as that he is baptized, and perhaps he is not baptized. And finally he concludes that it would be highly reckless and scandalous if, after the Church has accepted someone as Supreme Pontiff, one were to deny that he is the true Supreme Pontiff, unless one could demonstrate that he was not baptized or not a man; otherwise, one would deservedly be punished not only as vehemently suspect of heresy, but as a heretic. In this passage, Master Bagnez does not dare to simply condemn as heresy and against the faith the opposite of this proposition, and he seems to admit that it is not impossible to demonstrate that this man is not baptized. Cajetan, in the cited passage, says that we adore the Supreme Pontiff not conditionally on whether he is baptized, but absolutely, and yet he says: “Who knows if he was baptized?” Wherein he seems at least to admit that this circumstance is not held by faith. Finally, Torquemada, in the cited passage, says that the truth that this man is Supreme Pontiff has the character of Catholic truth, but with the addition of one naturally known proposition, namely, that this man was peacefully elected, it becomes a Catholic truth. And therefore in the Council of Constance it was determined that one questioned about the faith should be asked whether he believes that this man canonically elected is the true successor of Peter. Here Torquemada does not simply deny that it is a matter of faith that this man is Pontiff, but he says that it is held by faith supposing a certain naturally known truth, namely, that he was duly elected. |
| VIII. Secunda sententia tenet hanc propositionem, scilicet quod hic homo in particulari est summus pontifex solum esse mediate de fide, eo quod infertur ex una de fide, et altera cognita morali certitudine, aut naturali experientia, scilicet quod hic homo sit rite electus. Existimat enim hæc sententia duo. Primum, quod illa propositio pendet essentialiter in sua veritate ab illa propositione tamquam a præmissa, quod iste homo sit rite electus eo quod hunc hominem in particulari esse summum pontificem idem est, ac illi esse applicatum summum pontificatum, quod quidem essentialiter et per se pendet ab applicatione activa quæ fit per legitimam electionem ; secundum est, quod illa propositio: Hic homo est rite electus, non est nota per fidem divinam, seu per revelationem, aut definitionem, vel traditionem Ecclesiæ, sed solum per moralem quamdam certitudinem, quæ nititur eligentium declarationi. Hanc sententiam videtur tenere magister Cano supra citatus dum asserit in simili, quod hoc Concilium esse legitimum pendet ex una de fide, et altera naturaliter nota. Et ad eamdem sententiam accedunt, qui existimant solum esse temerarium, et scandalosum negare, quod in particulari hic homo sit summus pontifex, ut videtur tenere Bagnez ubi supra, et probabile censet Azorius tomo II, lib. cap. c. v, §. In hac controversia, quamvis ipse teneat esse contra fidem. Et hi debent convenire in hoc quod assensus talis propositionis non elicitur ab habitu fidei, sed ab habitu theologico (alias si ab habitu fidei eliceretur, oppositum esset hæresis, et contra fidem) quia est conclusio illata per discursum, fides autem non assentitur per discursum ; qui vero theologiæ habitum non habent in fide aliorum illam videntur tenere. |  | **VIII.** The second opinion maintains this proposition, namely that the statement “this particular man is the Supreme Pontiff” is only mediately of faith, insofar as it is inferred from one proposition that is of faith, and another that is known with moral certainty or by natural experience, namely that this man was duly elected. For this opinion holds two things. First, that this proposition essentially depends for its truth upon that proposition as a premise, that this man was duly elected, because for this particular man to be the Supreme Pontiff means that the supreme pontificate has been applied to him, which essentially and per se depends on the active application that occurs through legitimate election. Second, that the proposition “This man is duly elected” is not known through divine faith, or through revelation, or through definition, or through the tradition of the Church, but only through a certain moral certainty which relies on the declaration of the electors. Master Cano, cited above, seems to hold this opinion when he asserts in a similar case that “this Council is legitimate” depends on one proposition of faith and another known naturally. And those who believe it is only temerarious and scandalous to deny that this particular man is the Supreme Pontiff approach the same opinion, as Bañez seems to hold in the passage cited above, and which Azorius considers probable in Volume II, Book [chapter letter], chapter 5, §. “In this controversy,” although he himself holds it to be against the faith. And these must agree on this point that assent to such a proposition is not elicited from the habit of faith, but from the theological habit (otherwise, if it were elicited from the habit of faith, the opposite would be heresy and against the faith) because it is a conclusion inferred through discourse, whereas faith does not assent through discourse; but those who do not possess the habit of theology seem to hold it in the faith of others. |
| IX. Tertia sententia simpliciter fatetur hanc propositionem pertinere ad fidem, et immediate elici assensum ejus a fidei habitu. Hanc sententiam mihi videtur tenere Turrecremata ubi supra,quatenus ait esse veritatem catholicam, quod hic homo in particulari sit summus pontifex supposita quadam veritate naturaliter nota, scilicet quod iste sit rite electus, ubi hoc quod dicit: Supposita quadam veritate, satis indicat talem veritatem naturaliter notam, quod iste sit rite electus non influere per se, et essentialiter in illam veritatem: Quod iste sit summus pontifex, si enim influeret illa propositio non esset catholica veritas,quia veritas quæ ex altera naturaliter nota per se pendet, et infertur non est nisi conclusio theologica. Eamdem sententiam late docet magister Nugno supra citatus et Suarez, et Azorius, estque communis inter recentiores,et in eamdem facile trahuntur reliqui antiquiores ut mox ostendam. Pro illius ergo explicatione. |  | **IX.** The third opinion simply acknowledges that this proposition pertains to the faith, and that assent to it is immediately elicited from the habit of faith. This opinion seems to me to be held by Turrecremata in the above-cited work, insofar as he asserts it to be a Catholic truth that this particular man is the Supreme Pontiff, presupposing a certain naturally known truth, namely, that he has been duly elected. When he says “presupposing a certain truth,” he sufficiently indicates that such a naturally known truth—that this man has been duly elected—does not influence per se and essentially that truth: That this man is the Supreme Pontiff. For if that proposition were to influence it, it would not be a Catholic truth, because a truth which per se depends upon and is inferred from another naturally known truth is merely a theological conclusion. The same opinion is extensively taught by Master Nugno cited above, and by Suarez, and Azorius, and is common among more recent authors, and the remaining older authorities can easily be drawn to the same position, as I shall presently demonstrate. For the explanation of this opinion, therefore. |
| X. Sit conclusio: De fide divina est immediate hunc hominem in particulari rite electum et acceptatum ab Ecclesia esse summum pontificem, et successorem Petri, non solum quoad se,se detiam quoad nos, licet multo magis quoad nos id manifestetur, quando de facto pontifex aliquid definit, nec in ipso exercitio, et quasi practice aliquis Catholicorum ab hac conclusione dissentit, licet in actu signato, et quasi speculative putent se id non credere fide divina. In hac conclusione duo facienda sunt. Primum, eam explicare; deinde, a fundamentis probare, et præsertim ex auctoritate, secundum quam credimus hunc hominem in particulari esse papam. Et quidem explicatio hujus conclusionis meo videri præsertim pendet ex tribus. Primum est, quod electus in papam eligitur in regulam fidei taliter quod sicut liber canonicus Scripturæ, est quædam fidei regula scripta, ita homo electus in papam est quædam regula fidei animata: secundum est, quod Ecclesiæ commissum est a Christo Domino eligere sibi hominem, qui pro tempore sit talis regula, ut supra ostendimus, et eidem Ecclesiæ consequenter commissum est per suam acceptationem determinare quod sit canonice, et legitime electus; ita quod sicut ad pontificem, et Ecclesiam pertinet determinare, qui libri sint canonici, sic et ad ipsam pertinet determinare, qui homo sit electus in canonem, et regulam animatam fidei: tertium est, quod ista materia, scilicet hunc hominem esse rite electum, et canonice factum regulam fidei, est materia determinabilis de fide ab Ecclesia. |  | **X.** Let this be the conclusion: It is of divine faith immediately that this particular man who has been duly elected and accepted by the Church is the Supreme Pontiff and successor of Peter, not only in himself but also for us, although it is much more manifested to us when the pontiff actually defines something. No Catholic dissents from this conclusion in practice and in its exercise, although in theory and speculatively they may think they do not believe it by divine faith. In this conclusion, two things must be done. First, to explain it; then, to prove it from its foundations, especially from the authority according to which we believe this particular man to be the pope. Indeed, the explanation of this conclusion, in my view, depends especially on three points. First, that the one elected as pope is elected as a rule of faith such that just as a canonical book of Scripture is a certain written rule of faith, so the man elected as pope is a certain living rule of faith. Second, that the Church has been commissioned by Christ the Lord to elect for itself a man who for the time being is such a rule, as we have shown above, and consequently the same Church has been commissioned through its acceptance to determine that he has been canonically and legitimately elected; so that just as it pertains to the pontiff and the Church to determine which books are canonical, so it also pertains to it to determine which man is elected as the canon and living rule of faith. Third, that this matter, namely that this man has been duly elected and canonically made the rule of faith, is a matter determinable by the Church as a matter of faith. |
| XI. Quod ergo pontifex eligitur, et ponatur Ecclesiæ, ut regula fidei animata, abunde satis in superioribus ostendimus, cum constet ex evangelio dictum esse Petro et successoribus ejus, quod non deficeret fides ejus, et quod ipse confirmaret fratres in fide, et iterum quod portæ inferi non possint prævalere adversus eum, et ita sicut in antiquis patribus erat de fide loqui Spiritum sanctum ut ab ipsis res fidei traderentur per revelationem, ita debet esse de fide in pontifice determinate esse auctoritatem ad explicandam, et proponendam fidem ita quod in se gerit quasi personam omnium patrum. Unde optime dixit Bernardus libro secundo de consideratione ad Eugenium papam: « Indagemus, inquit, diligentius quis scis, quam geras videlicet pro tempore personam in Ecclesia Dei. Tu princeps episcoporum, tu hæres Apostolorum, tu primatu Abel, gubernatu Noe, patriarchatu Abraham, ordine Melchisedech, dignitate Aaron, auctoritate Moyses, judicatu Samuel, potestate Petrus, unctione Christus.» De quo et jam videndus est idem Bernardus libro quarto de consideratione in fine. Est ergo in papa auctoritas, et regula fidei animata, sicut in libris canonicis est regula, et auctoritas scripta,tamen differunt unumquodque juxta naturam suam, in papa enim est temporaliter et dependenter ab aliquibus conditionibus temporalibus quæ de novo fiunt et quia tales in particulari non sunt revelatæ, inde oritur ista dubitatio circa certitudinem, qua tenetur de fide hunc hominem esse papam: quæ dubitatio non versatur circa libros canonicos qui tamquam regula inanimata, et scripta declarati sunt ab Ecclesia tamquam authentici, oportet ergo quod regula ista declaretur, et propouatur fidelibus ab ipsa Ecclesia quoties de novo eligitur,ita quod sicut libri canonici declarantur tamquam regula fidei scriptæ in perpetuum, ita regula fidei animata, quia eligibilis est, et ad tempus durans, oportet quod per electionem et declarationem Ecclesiæ proponatur fidelibus, et ea proposita non minus tenentur acceptare illam, quam librum canonicum, qui est regula scripta; ista per revelationem habita, et per declarationem Ecclesiæ propositam, illa per electionem, et ejus acceptationem, quia sic postulat natura talis regulæ,quæ animataest,et pro temporeeligibilis. |  | **XI.** That the pontiff is elected and placed in the Church as a living rule of faith, we have shown abundantly enough in the preceding sections, since it is evident from the Gospel that it was said to Peter and his successors that his faith would not fail, and that he himself would confirm the brethren in the faith, and again that the gates of hell cannot prevail against him. And thus, just as in the ancient fathers it was a matter of faith that the Holy Spirit spoke through them so that matters of faith might be transmitted by them through revelation, so too it must be a matter of faith that in the pontiff resides the authority to explain and propose the faith in such a way that he bears in himself, as it were, the person of all the fathers. Whence Bernard excellently said in the second book of “De Consideratione” to Pope Eugene: “Let us inquire,” he says, “more diligently who you are, that is, what person you bear for this time in the Church of God. You are the prince of bishops, you are the heir of the Apostles, you are primacy in Abel, governance in Noah, patriarchate in Abraham, order in Melchizedek, dignity in Aaron, authority in Moses, judgment in Samuel, power in Peter, anointing in Christ.” Concerning this, the same Bernard should be consulted in the fourth book of “De Consideratione” at the end. Therefore, in the pope there is authority and a living rule of faith, just as in the canonical books there is a written rule and authority, yet each differs according to its nature. For in the pope it exists temporally and dependently on certain temporal conditions which are newly established, and because such conditions in particular are not revealed, from this arises that doubt concerning the certainty with which one holds as a matter of faith that this man is pope—a doubt which does not pertain to the canonical books, which, as an inanimate and written rule, have been declared authentic by the Church. It is necessary, therefore, that this rule be declared and proposed to the faithful by the Church itself whenever a new election occurs, so that just as the canonical books are declared as a written rule of faith in perpetuity, so the living rule of faith, because it is subject to election and endures for a time, must be proposed to the faithful through the election and declaration of the Church. And once proposed, the faithful are no less bound to accept it than a canonical book, which is a written rule—the latter obtained through revelation and proposed through the declaration of the Church, the former through election and its acceptance, because this is what the nature of such a rule demands, which is living and subject to election for a time. |
| XII. Quod vero ad Ecclesiam pertineat declarare, et determinare, quod sit canonice, et legitime electus, sive per acceptationem universalem pacificam, sive per definitionem Concilii, si sit aliquod dubium in illa, sicut pertinet declarare quis liber sit, vel non sit canonicus, ex articulo præcedenti patet, ubi ostendimus Ecclesiæ commissam esse a Christo Domino electionem summi pontificis, et consequenter ad ipsam pertinet determinare, et declarare quod electio sit legitima, et canonica; tum, quia ad ipsam pertinet legitime eligere, et tamquam legitime electum proponere fidelibus; ergo debet habere potestatem discernendi inter legitimam, et non legitimam electionem, quod fieri non potest, nisi ad ejus potestatem pertineat declarare quæ electio sit legitima; tum, quia si electio non sit pacifica, et pacifice acceptata, sed rationabiliter dubia, non potest pontifex procedere ad definiendum, et determinandum de ipsamet electione, quia stante illo dubio non potest obligare, ut ejus determinationes acceptentur pro legitimis, et indubitatis; ergo necesse est quod Ecclesia pacifice acceptando determinet electionem non esse dubiam, sed legitimam. Quod vero hoc quod est esse canonice electum sit materia determinabilis secundum fidem ab Ecclesia ex eo patet, quia quando aliquid est regula fidei, et ut talis proponitur fidelibus, non minus est credibile per fidem, quod ista regula sit vera, et legitima quam quod sit de fide id quod determinatur per illam, sicut quando proponitur aliquis liber tamquam canonicus, sicut est de fide id quod in illo continetur, ita est de fide quod liber ille sit canonicus, et per revelationem Dei habitus: et similiter quando aliquid definitur a Concilio legitimo, vel a papa, non solum est de fide id quod per illum definitur, sed etiam quod illa sit vera, et legitima definitio obligans ad credendum; et quando aliquod Concilium confirmatur a pontifice decernit, quod illud est legitimum, et observari mandat; ergo similiter quando aliquis proponitur tamquam regula infallibilis fidei, definibile est quod sit legitimus pontifex, et legitime electus. Et hujus ratio est, quia quando aliquid definitur, de fide est esse legitimæ definitum : ergo etiam potest, et debet esse de fide quod definitio ejus sit legitima ; ergo similiter in quæcumque alia regula regulante res fidei, si de fide est esse regulatum legitime hic et nunc in particulari, etiam credi debet per fidem, quod regula ipsa sit legitima, quæ regulat hic et nunc. Quare hunc hominem esse electum in regulam legitimam, est materia credibilis per fidem, sicut statim amplius ostendetur. Id autem determinare potest tamquam de fide, quia Ecclesia errare non potest in his, quæ de fide sunt, cum sit columna, et firmamentum veritatis ; ergo si universaliter acceptat aliquid quod est materia credibilis per fidem, determinare eam potest tamquam de fide. |  | **XII.** That it pertains to the Church to declare and determine who has been canonically and legitimately elected, either through peaceful universal acceptance or through the definition of a Council if there is any doubt in the matter—just as it pertains to the Church to declare which book is or is not canonical—is evident from the preceding article, where we showed that the election of the Supreme Pontiff was entrusted by Christ the Lord to the Church. Consequently, it belongs to the Church herself to determine and declare that an election is legitimate and canonical. First, because it pertains to the Church to legitimately elect and to present to the faithful one who has been legitimately elected; therefore, she must have the power to discern between a legitimate and illegitimate election, which cannot be done unless it belongs to her power to declare which election is legitimate. Second, because if an election is not peaceful and peacefully accepted, but reasonably doubtful, the pontiff cannot proceed to define and determine regarding that very election, since while such doubt persists, he cannot oblige that his determinations be accepted as legitimate and indubitable. Therefore, it is necessary that the Church, by peacefully accepting, determines the election to be not doubtful but legitimate. That this matter of being canonically elected is determinable according to the faith by the Church is evident from this: when something is a rule of faith and as such is proposed to the faithful, it is no less credible through faith that this rule is true and legitimate than that what is determined through it is a matter of faith. Just as when a book is proposed as canonical, it is not only a matter of faith what is contained in it, but it is also a matter of faith that the book itself is canonical and held by God’s revelation. Similarly, when something is defined by a legitimate Council or by the Pope, not only is what is defined through it a matter of faith, but also that it is a true and legitimate definition obliging one to believe. And when a Council is confirmed by the Pontiff, he decrees that it is legitimate and orders it to be observed. Therefore, similarly, when someone is proposed as an infallible rule of faith, it is definable that he is the legitimate pontiff and legitimately elected. The reason for this is that when something is defined, it is a matter of faith that it has been legitimately defined. Therefore, it can and should also be a matter of faith that its definition is legitimate. Similarly, in whatever other rule regulating matters of faith, if it is a matter of faith that something is legitimately regulated here and now in a particular case, it should also be believed through faith that the rule itself which regulates here and now is legitimate. Therefore, that this man has been elected as a legitimate rule is a matter credible through faith, as will be shown more fully immediately. The Church can determine this as a matter of faith because the Church cannot err in matters of faith, since she is the pillar and foundation of truth. Therefore, if she universally accepts something that is a matter credible through faith, she can determine it as a matter of faith. |
| XIII. His explicatis conclusio posita probatur. Et primo, nam Martinus V, in Concilio Constantiensi in damnatione errorum Wiclephi, quæ habetur post sessionum XLV, et ultimam Concilii, in interrogationibus, quæ faciendæ sunt suspectis in fide ad indagandum, an legitime credant, ponit hanc interrogationem : « Item utrum credat quod papa canonice electus, qui pro tempore fuerit ejus nomine proprio expresso sit successor Beati Petri habens supremam auctoritatem in Ecclesia Dei ? » Quæ verba non loquuntur de veritate illius propositionis in communi : Quod omnis rite electus est summus pontifex, sed in particulari de eo qui pro tempore est pontifex exprimendo nomen proprium verbi gratia Innocentium X et de hoc cujus nomen proprium exprimitur, jubet pontifex, ut interrogetur suspectus in fide, an credat quod talis sit successor Petri, et summus pontifex ; ergo hoc pertinet ad actum credendi, non ad illationem, aut ad moralem certitudinem, neutrum enim est credere. Item, quia de fide credimus hanc numero Ecclesiam, in qua sumus, esse Ecclesiam catholicam, et apostolicam, habereque caput visibile in terris; sed facta electione pacifica, et indubitata acceptata, non potest recipi, et haberi pro vera Ecclesia illa quae non fuerit unita cum suo capite visibili, eique subjecta; ergo oportet quod sicut est de fide hanc numero Ecclesiam esse veram Ecclesiam ex illa auctoritate, qua credimus: Unam, sanctam, catholicam, et apostolicam Ecclesiam, ita sit de fide, facta legitima electione, quod iste homo, cui tamquam capiti suo unitur, sit vere caput Ecclesiae, et summus pontifex. |  | **XIII.** Having explained these matters, the stated conclusion is proven. And first, Martin V, in the Council of Constance, in the condemnation of the errors of Wycliffe, which appears after the forty-fifth and final session of the Council, among the interrogations to be put to those suspected in faith to ascertain whether they believe legitimately, places this interrogation: “Also, whether he believes that the canonically elected pope, whoever he may be at the time, with his proper name expressed, is the successor of Blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God?” These words do not speak of the truth of that proposition in general: That everyone rightly elected is the Supreme Pontiff, but in particular of him who is pontiff at the time, expressing his proper name, for example Innocent X, and concerning this person whose proper name is expressed, the pontiff commands that the person suspected in faith be interrogated whether he believes that such a one is the successor of Peter and Supreme Pontiff. Therefore, this pertains to an act of believing, not to an inference or to moral certainty, for neither of these constitutes believing. Likewise, because by faith we believe this particular Church, in which we are, to be the Catholic and Apostolic Church, and to have a visible head on earth; but once a peaceful and undoubted election has been accepted, that church cannot be received and held as the true Church which is not united with its visible head and subject to him. Therefore, just as it is a matter of faith that this particular Church is the true Church by that authority by which we believe: “One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church,” so it is a matter of faith, once a legitimate election has been conducted, that this man, to whom it is united as to its head, is truly the head of the Church and the Supreme Pontiff. |
| XIV. Deinde secundo ostenditur eadem conclusio esse de fide quoad se, et quoad nos ex vi electionis acceptatae pacifice ab Ecclesia. Duo autem sunt quae Ecclesia acceptat in pontifice, alterum quod hic et nunc in particulari sit regula fidei infallibilis, alterum quod acceptat illum tamquam caput, cui universalis Ecclesia unitur, et sic acceptato facit hanc propositionem esse de fide, nam impossibile est, quod Ecclesia erret in acceptanda quacumque regula fidei sive sit definitio Concilii, sive liber aliquis canonicus, sive traditio aliqua, et quod acceptando illam tamquam regulam fidei, non sit de fide quod illa sit vera, et legitima regula: ergo etiam impossibile est, quod Ecclesia erret in acceptando summo pontifice in particulari, si quidem acceptat illum tamquam regulam supremam, et animatam in proponendis rebus fidei. Antecedens praeter dicta patet, quia si non est certum secundum fidem, quod iste liber in particulari sit canonicus, aut ista definitio sit legitima definitio, non possumus esse certi de rebus definitis, aut traditis in libro canonico: neque est simile de proponente proxime res fidei, et prædicante eas, quem non tenemur credere de fide, quod sit legitimus minister evangelii, quia ille qui prædicat evangelium, et proponit res fidei non se habet tamquam regula determinativa rerum fidei, sed solum ut minister intimans aliis ea, quæ credenda sunt, unde nec alii, qui credunt moventur ab illius auctoritate, sed ex credibilitate eorum quæ proponuntur, et nisi sufficienter proponantur, ita ut eorum credibilitas innotescat audienti, non obligatur credere. At vero pontifex proponit res credendas tamquam regula fidei et judex determinans quænam credenda sint, et ita ex ejus auctoritate obligatur homo ad credendum: necesse est ergo quod fideles sint certi quod ille qui definit, et regulat res fidei, habeat auctoritatem illas regulandi, et definiendi, alias enim si contingeret dubitare de auctoritate quam habet hic in particulari definiens, non poterit esse certus quod res maneant definitæ de fide; sicut si dubitatur de aliquo libro canonico, an vero sit canonicus, non potest manere certitudo de his, quæ in illo continentur. |  | **XIV.** Next, secondly, it is demonstrated that the same conclusion is de fide both in itself and with respect to us by virtue of an election peacefully accepted by the Church. There are two things that the Church accepts in a pontiff: first, that here and now in particular he is an infallible rule of faith; second, that it accepts him as the head to whom the universal Church is united. And thus, having accepted him, it makes this proposition to be de fide, for it is impossible that the Church should err in accepting any rule of faith—whether it be the definition of a Council, or some canonical book, or some tradition—and that by accepting it as a rule of faith, it should not be de fide that it is a true and legitimate rule. Therefore, it is likewise impossible that the Church should err in accepting a Supreme Pontiff in particular, since it accepts him as the supreme and living rule in proposing matters of faith. The antecedent, besides what has been said, is evident because if it is not certain according to faith that this particular book is canonical, or that this definition is a legitimate definition, we cannot be certain about the matters defined or transmitted in a canonical book. Nor is this similar to one who proximately proposes or preaches matters of faith, whom we are not bound to believe de fide to be a legitimate minister of the Gospel, because he who preaches the Gospel and proposes matters of faith does not function as a determinative rule of matters of faith, but only as a minister intimating to others those things which are to be believed. Hence, others who believe are not moved by his authority, but by the credibility of those things which are proposed, and unless they are sufficiently proposed so that their credibility becomes known to the hearer, he is not obliged to believe. But the pontiff proposes matters to be believed as a rule of faith and as a judge determining what must be believed, and thus by his authority man is obliged to believe. It is therefore necessary that the faithful be certain that he who defines and regulates matters of faith has the authority to regulate and define them; otherwise, if it should happen that one doubts the authority which this particular definer has, one cannot be certain that the matters remain defined de fide—just as if one doubts whether some canonical book is truly canonical, there cannot remain certainty concerning those things which are contained in it. |
| XV. Secundum, quod acceptat Ecclesia universaliter est, quod sit caput ejus uniendo se illi tamquam visibili capiti supremo et subjiciendo se illi: non enim sufficit quod Ecclesia subjiciat se cuicumque rite electo in pontificem quasi in communi, sed alicui visibili capiti debet esse unita, et subjecta; non est autem visibile, nisi sit determinatum in particulari; ergo oportet quod Ecclesia huic in particulari se subjiciat, et uniat tamquam capiti, quam subjectionem, et unionem facit Ecclesia hoc ipso, quod pacifice acceptat electionem factam in hac determinata persona, vel illa. Sed hoc ipsum est determinare infallibiliter, quod ille homo sit caput Ecclesiae, si quidem in exercitio tota Ecclesia illi unitur, ut capiti, ipsumque recognoscit : tota autem Ecclesia in hoc errare non potest, ergo in ipso exercitio Ecclesia determinat, quod iste homo sit caput suum, ita ut sint schismatici, qui oppositum sentiunt, nulla enim major determinatio esse potest, quod iste sit pontifex, quam quod universalis Ecclesia sic ipsum recognoscat pro pontifice, et acceptet, idem enim est Ecclesiam universalem dicere in actu signato : Hic homo est vere et legitime pontifex, et quod universalis Ecclesia in ipso exercitio id dicat, uniendo se, et subjiciendo se illi tamquam capiti. Haec ergo determinatio cum versetur circa materiam fidei, scilicet quod haec Ecclesia universalis sit unita suo visibili capiti in particulari, quo sublato ruit totum, quod de Ecclesia credimus, quod sit vera hic et nunc, et catholica, necesse est quod illa determinatio Ecclesiae circa talem materiam, recognoscendo hunc hominem, tamquam supremam regulam, sit determinatio de fide. |  | **XV.** The second [principle] that the Church universally accepts is that he [the Pope] is her head, as she unites herself to him as the supreme visible head and subjects herself to him. For it is not sufficient that the Church subject herself to whoever is rightly elected as pontiff in a general sense, but she must be united and subject to a visible head; and this is not visible unless it is determined in particular. Therefore, it is necessary that the Church subject herself to and unite with this particular person as head. The Church accomplishes this subjection and union by the very fact that she peacefully accepts the election made in this specific person or that one. But this itself is to determine infallibly that this man is the head of the Church, since indeed in practice the whole Church unites herself to him as head and recognizes him as such. The whole Church cannot err in this matter; therefore, in the very exercise [of this recognition], the Church determines that this man is her head, such that those who hold the opposite view are schismatics. For there can be no greater determination that someone is pontiff than that the universal Church recognizes and accepts him as pontiff. It is the same thing for the universal Church to say explicitly, “This man is truly and legitimately pontiff,” as for the universal Church to say it implicitly through her actual practice by uniting and subjecting herself to him as head. Since this determination concerns a matter of faith—namely, that this universal Church is united to her visible head in particular, without which everything we believe about the Church (that she is true here and now, and catholic) collapses—it is necessary that this determination of the Church regarding such a matter, by recognizing this man as the supreme rule, is a determination of faith. |
| XVI. Et hoc ipsum amplius confirmatur, quando non solum Ecclesia in actu exercito ipsum acceptat in pontificem, et ejus electionem, sed etiam quando ipse pontifex in exercitio definit aliquid tamquam de fine tenendum ; tunc enim impossibile est, quod de fide credamus illud objectum tamquam definitum, et non credamus ipsam definitionem esse legitimam, et consequenter ipsum definientem hic et nunc infallibilem auctoritatem habere circa determinationem, et regulationem rerum fidei, quod est credere quod hic homo definiens sit papa, et supremam auctoritatem in Ecclesia habeat. Unde quando pontifex sic definit nullus catholicorum est, qui assentiens rebus definitis credendo, in actu exercitio non credat etiam ipsum, qui proponit definiendo, et regulando habere hanc supremam potestatem regulativam fidei, et consequenter in actu exercito credit esse papam, licet quando postea haec veritas quasi in actu signato, et speculative seorsum cogitatur non appareat propter multas circumstantias, et conditiones, quae concernunt hunc aut illum hominem in particulari quomodo id sit de fide, cum non videatur revelatio omnia illa in particulari attingere, et declarare nobis. |  | **XVI.** And this same point is further confirmed when not only does the Church in actual practice accept him as pontiff and [accept] his election, but also when the pontiff himself in the exercise [of his office] defines something as to be held as a matter of faith; for then it is impossible that we believe by faith that object as defined, and not believe that the definition itself is legitimate, and consequently that the one defining here and now has infallible authority concerning the determination and regulation of matters of faith, which is to believe that this defining man is the pope and has supreme authority in the Church. Hence, when the pontiff thus defines, there is no Catholic who, while assenting to the defined matters by believing, does not also in actual practice believe that he who proposes by defining and regulating has this supreme regulative power of faith, and consequently in actual practice believes him to be the pope, even though when afterward this truth is, as it were, considered separately in a formal act and speculatively, it does not appear, on account of the many circumstances and conditions that concern this or that particular man, how this is a matter of faith, since revelation does not seem to touch upon and declare to us all these particulars. |
| **XVII.** Tertio probatur non sufficere quod certitudine quadam morali teneamus hunc esse pontificem, nam saltem debemus credere quod omnia, quae facit iste homo in particulari sunt rite facta eo modo, quo ab aliis veris pontificibus fiunt, ergo debet talis homo, vel credi certo quod sit verius pontifex, vel credi quod utitur privilegio veri summi pontificis. Antecedens patet, quia in hoc ipso quod pacifice acceptatur, ut pontifex, vere obligantur omnes ad acceptandum quaecumque ab ipso definita fuerint, et definitiones fidei credere tenentur; ergo oportet credere, quod illa sunt rite facta, et verae definitiones: ergo etiam quod habet ille homo quidquid requiritur, ut ejus acta sint valida, alias si valida non essent, falleretur Ecclesia in acceptandis, et credendis his, quae ab ipso definiuntur. Si autem credimus quod hic homo in particulari habet quidquid requiritur, ut definitiones ab ipso factae sint legitimae, et verae, oportet quod credamus, vel quod habet in re auctoritatem summi pontificis, vel quod si in re habet aliquem defectum ratione cujus non sit pontifex, tamen Deus supplet quidquid requiritur, ut ejus acta sint valida, ne Ecclesia in hoc fallatur, hoc autem aeque incertum est, atque illud primum, nam non est magis revelatum, quod huic homini confert Deus privilegia pontificis, et supplet ejus auctoritatem, quam quod in re sit pontifex, præsertim cum istud supplementum, et concessio extraordinaria non fundetur in ipsa promissione Christi, quæ solum facta est Petro, et ejus successoribus; ergo sine nova revelatione constare non potest; debet ergo credi quod in re sit pontifex et quod Deus non permittet eligi eum, qui capax non sit illius dignitatis. |  | **XVII.** Third, it is proven that it is not sufficient for us to hold with moral certainty that this person is the pontiff, for at the very least we must believe that everything which this particular man does is properly done in the same way as it is done by other true pontiffs. Therefore, such a man must either be believed with certainty to be the true pontiff, or be believed to exercise the privilege of a true supreme pontiff. The antecedent is clear, because by the very fact that he is peacefully accepted as pontiff, all are truly obligated to accept whatever has been defined by him, and they are bound to believe the definitions of faith. Therefore, it is necessary to believe that those acts are properly done and are true definitions. Consequently, it is also necessary to believe that this man has whatever is required for his acts to be valid; otherwise, if they were not valid, the Church would be deceived in accepting and believing those things which are defined by him. But if we believe that this particular man has whatever is required for the definitions made by him to be legitimate and true, we must believe either that he truly possesses the authority of the supreme pontiff, or that if he truly has some defect by reason of which he is not the pontiff, nevertheless God supplies whatever is required for his acts to be valid, lest the Church be deceived in this matter. However, this is equally uncertain as the first proposition, for it is no more revealed that God confers the privileges of the pontiff upon this man and supplies his authority, than that he is truly the pontiff—especially since this supplementation and extraordinary concession is not founded on Christ’s promise itself, which was made only to Peter and his successors. Therefore, without a new revelation, this cannot be established. It ought therefore to be believed that he is truly the pontiff and that God will not permit one to be elected who is not capable of that dignity. |
| **XVIII.** Nec dici potest definitiones Conciliorum, prout ab aliquo Concilio in particulari fiunt, vel definitiones pontificum, prout ab isto in particulari procedunt, non sunt de fide, quia ab istis fiunt in particulari (quia potest contingere quod aliquod non sit verum Concilium) sed quia ab Ecclesia acceptantur, et ideo sufficit de isto pontifice, aut de isto Concilio in particulari secundum certitudinem moralem credere quod habeant illam auctoritatem. Sed contra est, nam Ecclesia non habet majorem auctoritatem ad faciendum res de fide per suam acceptationem, quam Concilium hoc in particulari, vel pontifex per suam definitionem, imo tota Ecclesia secundum auctoritatem suam est in Concilio; ergo ratio determinans, et declarans rem esse de fide, non est acceptatio Ecclesiæ, sed definitio Concilii, aut papæ, nec Christus Dominus promisit infallibilitatem, et indeficientiam fidei ipsi acceptationi Ecclesiæ, sed ipsi Petro, aut ejus successoribus; ergo non innititur confirmatio fidei Ecclesiæ acceptanti, sed Petro confirmanti; imo Concilium, in quo est tota Ecclesia auctoritative confirmationem petit in determinationibus fidei ab ipso pontifice pro tempore, et in particulari considerato; ergo non fit confirmatio fidei per acceptationem Ecclesiæ, sed per definitionem papæ: ac denique si acceptatio Ecclesiæ facit rem esse de fide, etiam si Concilium in particulari, aut pontifex in particulari legitimus non esset: ergo etiam acceptatio Ecclesiæ, qua pacifice acceptat aliquem hominem in pontificem, et in regulam fidei, facit quod sit de fide hunc hominem esse papam, si quidem id est materia credibilis per fidem sicut de quacumque regula fidei est credibile, quod sit regula legitima, ut ostendimus: ergo acceptatio Ecclesiæ in hac materia, quæ de fide est cum errare non possit, reddit illam de fide. |  | **XVIII.** Nor can it be said that the definitions of Councils, as they are made by any particular Council, or the definitions of popes, as they proceed from this particular pope, are not matters of faith because they are made by these particular authorities (since it may happen that some Council is not a true Council), but rather because they are accepted by the Church, and therefore it suffices to believe with moral certainty that this particular pope or this particular Council has that authority. But against this: the Church does not have greater authority to make matters of faith through its acceptance than this particular Council or pontiff has through his definition; indeed, the whole Church, according to its authority, is represented in the Council. Therefore, the determining and declaring factor that something is a matter of faith is not the acceptance of the Church, but the definition of the Council or the pope. Nor did Christ the Lord promise infallibility and indefectibility of faith to the acceptance of the Church itself, but to Peter himself and his successors. Therefore, the confirmation of the faith does not rest on the Church’s acceptance, but on Peter’s confirmation. Indeed, the Council, in which the whole Church is authoritatively present, seeks confirmation in determinations of faith from the pontiff himself for that time and considered in particular. Therefore, the confirmation of faith does not occur through the acceptance of the Church, but through the definition of the pope. And finally, if the acceptance of the Church makes something a matter of faith, even if a particular Council or a particular legitimate pontiff did not exist, then the acceptance of the Church, by which it peacefully accepts some man as pontiff and as a rule of faith, also makes it a matter of faith that this man is pope, since this is a matter that can be believed through faith, just as it is believable about any rule of faith that it is a legitimate rule, as we have shown. Therefore, the acceptance of the Church in this matter, which is of faith since it cannot err, renders it a matter of faith. |
| **SOLVUNTUR ARGUMENTA.** |  | **ANSWERING THE ARGUMENTS.** |
| **XIX.** Pro parte ergo negativa, quod scilicet non sit de fide hunc electum esse pontificem, plura solent argumenta coacervari. Nos difficultates omnes ad quatuor capita reducimus, sicut enim unaquæque res per quatuor causas producitur in esse, et conservatur, sic suo modo juxta quatuor causas, quæ concurrunt ad hanc veritatem, quod hic homo sit pontifex, proponamus difficultates quas ad illas quatuor causas, seu capita reducimus. Primo ergo arguitur ex parte causæ finalis, nam tota ratio propter quam necesse est de fide, hunc hominem esse pontificem, est propter certitudinem quam habemus de Ecclesia, quod sit vera, et legitima congregatio fidelium, etiam illa numero, quam nunc videmus, et sic necesse est, quod eadem certitudine teneatur, quod ille qui nunc est legitime electus sit papa; sed hæc ratio nihil probat; ergo. Minor probatur, nam non est minus necessaria certitudo sacramentorum in Ecclesia puta baptismi, aut eucharistiae, quam sit necessaria certitudo hujus capitis in particulari; pro certitudine autem sacramentorum sufficienter provisum est, ut per fidem credamus eorum veritatem in communi, in particulari autem solum certitudine morali nobis constet de veritate hujus, aut illius sacramenti, nec enim est de fide hanc hostiam in particulari esse consecratam, licet sit de fide omnem hostiam rite consecratam realiter continere in se corpus Christi, sicut docet D. Thomas 2-2, quæst.1, art.III ad tertium et ad quartum ergo eodem modo sufficit,quod sit de fide; omnem hominem legitime electum esse papam, non tamen sit de fide hunc in particulari rite electum esse, et esse papam, sed sufficit quod id teneatur certitudine quadam morali, vel ad summum tamquam conclusio theologica inferatur ex principiis fidei. |  | **XIX.** For the negative position, namely that it is not a matter of faith that this elected person is the pontiff, several arguments are usually amassed. We reduce all the difficulties to four headings, for just as each thing is brought into being and preserved through four causes, so in a similar manner, according to the four causes that contribute to this truth—that this man is pontiff—let us present the difficulties which we reduce to those four causes or headings. First, therefore, the argument is made from the perspective of the final cause, for the entire reason why it is necessary as a matter of faith that this man is pontiff is on account of the certainty we have concerning the Church—that it is the true and legitimate congregation of the faithful, even that very one which we now see—and thus it is necessary that with the same certainty it be held that the one who is now legitimately elected is the pope; but this reasoning proves nothing; therefore [the conclusion does not follow]. The minor premise is proven, for the certainty of the sacraments in the Church, such as baptism or the Eucharist, is no less necessary than the certainty concerning this particular head [of the Church]; yet for the certainty of the sacraments, it is sufficiently provided that through faith we believe their truth in general, while in particular cases we are assured only with moral certainty about the truth of this or that sacrament. For it is not a matter of faith that this particular host is consecrated, although it is a matter of faith that every properly consecrated host really contains within itself the body of Christ, as St. Thomas teaches in the Secunda Secundae, question 1, article 3, in reply to the third and fourth objections. Therefore, in the same way, it suffices that it be a matter of faith that every legitimately elected man is the pope, yet it need not be a matter of faith that this particular individual has been properly elected and is the pope, but it suffices that this be held with a certain moral certainty, or at most be inferred as a theological conclusion from the principles of faith. |
| **XX.** Si dicas esse diversam rationem de hac hostia in particulari, et de hoc homine in particulari electo in summum pontificem, quia hic est caput Ecclesiæ universalis, atque de illo ita debet constare de fide quod sit caput Ecclesiæ, sicut de hac numero congregatione fidelium constat quod sit Ecclesia, quia veritas Ecclesiæ pendet ex unione cum suo capite, quæ ratio non currit in hac hostia in particulari, aut in quolibet alio sacramento, contra est quia veritas Ecclesiæ non pendet simpliciter a veritate sui capitis in particulari, ut patet quando est schisma, vel vacat sedes, tunc enim est de fide esse Ecclesiam independentem a capite; ergo ut talis fides continuetur existente capite non est necesse quod sit de fide illum esse papam. Secundo, quia Ecclesiæ auctoritas etiam pendet a congregatione episcoporum, in illis enim auctoritative est Ecclesia, et tamen ad hoc non est necesse, quod sit de fide illos esse episcopos; ergo similiter in nostro casu. |  | **XX.** If you should say that there is a different rationale concerning this particular host and this particular man elected as Supreme Pontiff, because the latter is the head of the universal Church, and therefore it ought to be a matter of faith that he is the head of the Church, just as it is established by faith that this particular congregation of the faithful is the Church, because the truth of the Church depends on union with its head—a rationale which does not apply to this particular host, or to any other sacrament—against this argument is the fact that the truth of the Church does not depend absolutely on the truth of its particular head, as is evident when there is a schism, or when the See is vacant. For then it is a matter of faith that the Church exists independently of a head; therefore, for such faith to continue when a head exists, it is not necessary that it be a matter of faith that this person is the Pope. Secondly, because the authority of the Church also depends on the congregation of bishops, for in them the Church authoritatively exists, and yet for this it is not necessary that it be a matter of faith that they are bishops; therefore, similarly in our case. |
| **XXI.** Respondetur solutione ibi data, nec enim est minus necessaria certitudo sacramentorum, quam certitudo capitis Ecclesiae, si caetera sint paria, non e contra, sunt enim necessitates diversi generis, cum una requiratur in ordine ad consequendam salutem tantum, altera etiam in ordine ad regulandum, et determinandum ea quae sunt fidei, tamquam regula infallibilis illius. Sacramenta autem secundum quod in particulari procedunt ab aliquo ministro non se habent ut regula fidei, nec ex eorum unitate visibili, aut unione cum ipsis pendet essentialiter unitas Ecclesiae, sed se habent ut medicinae peccatorum, et instrumenta gratiae: unde circa ipsa sacramenta in particulari nulla Ecclesiae acceptatio, aut definitio versatur, sed solum circa ipsa sacramenta in specie, quia eorum natura, et virtus definitioni fidei subest, non eorum usus, et exercitium. In pontifice autem non solum fides versatur circa ejus potestatem in communi, sed etiam circa acceptationem ejus in particulari, quia acceptatur ut regula fidei, et caput Ecclesiae, et per suas definitiones in particulari innotescit ejus auctoritas. Unde debet in particulari acceptari sicut quaecumque alia regula fidei, ut dictum est. |  | **XXI.** The response is given with the solution stated there, for the certainty of the sacraments is not less necessary than the certainty of the head of the Church, if other things are equal, but not conversely, since these are necessities of different kinds. One is required only for the purpose of attaining salvation, while the other is required also for the purpose of regulating and determining matters of faith, as the infallible rule thereof. The sacraments, however, insofar as they proceed in particular from some minister, do not function as a rule of faith, nor does the visible unity of the Church, or its union with them, essentially depend on them, but they function as medicines for sins and instruments of grace. Hence, regarding these sacraments in particular, no acceptance or definition of the Church is concerned, but only regarding the sacraments in their species, because their nature and power is subject to the definition of faith, not their use and exercise. In the case of the pontiff, however, faith is concerned not only with his power in general, but also with his acceptance in particular, because he is accepted as the rule of faith and the head of the Church, and through his particular definitions his authority becomes known. Hence, he must be accepted in particular like any other rule of faith, as has been stated. |
| XXII. Et si adhuc urgeas, non minus esse de fide Ecclesiam esse sanctam quoad sacramenta, quam esse unam, et apostolicam quoad unionem cum suo capite, sed non obstante sanctitate Ecclesiae quoad sacramenta adhuc non est de fide hanc hostiam in particulari esse consecratam; ergo non obstante unitate Ecclesiae, et ratione apostolicae quoad unionem capitis, non erit de fide hunc hominem numero esse pontificem respondetur, quod licet ex fide habeatur quod Ecclesia sit sancta quoad sacramenta, et quod sit apostolica quantum ad unionem cum suo capite apostolico, tamen pluribus modis debet fides versari circa potestatem apostolicam pontificis, quam circa sacramenta, quia non solum credit dari potestatem apostolicam, sed etiam debet in exercitio determinare hic et nunc, quod sit regula fidei, et illi uniatur Ecclesia tamquam visibili capiti: circa sacramenta autem solum credit vere esse sacramenta, quæ debito modo fiunt, de ipso autem usu, et exercitio eorum non dictat. |  | **XXII.** And if you still insist that it is no less a matter of faith that the Church is holy with respect to the sacraments than that it is one and apostolic with respect to its union with its head, but that despite the holiness of the Church with respect to the sacraments, it is still not a matter of faith that this particular host is consecrated; therefore, despite the unity of the Church and its apostolic character regarding union with its head, it will not be a matter of faith that this specific man is the pontiff—it is answered that, although it is held by faith that the Church is holy with respect to the sacraments, and that it is apostolic with respect to its union with its apostolic head, nevertheless, faith must engage with the apostolic power of the pontiff in more ways than with the sacraments, because it not only believes that apostolic power is given, but must also determine here and now in practice that it is the rule of faith, and that the Church is united to him as its visible head. Regarding the sacraments, however, faith only believes that those sacraments which are properly performed are true sacraments, but does not dictate anything about their actual use and exercise. |
| XXIII. Ad replicam vero contra hanc solutionem dicitur, quod veritas, et unitas Ecclesiæ vacante sede non pendet a capite actu, sed aptitudine, quia scilicet est apta, et de se petit ista congregatio esse sub uno capite, quod actu non habet; nos autem loquimur quando Ecclesia habet actu caput, et acceptavit ejus electionem tamquam legitimam, tunc enim nisi illi homini in particulari uniatur, peribit unitas Ecclesiæ. In schismate autem si sint duo de quibus rationabile dubium sit, quisnam eorum sit pontifex, tunc est idem, ac si non haberet actu caput, quia nondum illud habet determinate, et pacifice secundum jus. Si autem unus eorum determinate sit pontifex, et alter irrationaliter usurpet pontificatum, tunc sicut debet Ecclesia verum caput acceptare, et illi uniri, ita et de fide est, quod ille, et non alter sit pontifex. |  | **XXIII.** To the objection against this solution, it is stated that the truth and unity of the Church, when the See is vacant, does not depend on the head in actuality but in potentiality, because this congregation is suitable and by its nature seeks to be under one head, which it does not actually have at present. However, we are speaking of when the Church actually has a head and has accepted his election as legitimate; then, unless it is united to that particular man, the unity of the Church will perish. In a schism, if there are two individuals about whom there is reasonable doubt as to which of them is the pontiff, then it is the same as if the Church did not actually have a head, because it does not yet have one determinately and peacefully according to law. If, however, one of them is determinately the pontiff, and the other irrationally usurps the pontificate, then just as the Church ought to accept the true head and be united to him, so it is also a matter of faith that he, and not the other, is the pontiff. |
| XXIV. Ad secundam replicam respondetur, quod in congregatione episcoporum si sit Concilium generale legitime congregatum de fide est illam congregationem repræsentare Ecclesiam, et auctoritative esse totam Ecclesiam, eo modo quo est de fide illud esse legitimum Concilium : ad hoc autem non est necesse, quod sit de fide unumquemque episcopum, aut omnes divisive esse episcopos, quia nullus eorum in particulari, nec omnes divisive se habent ut regula fidei, sed solum est de fide congregationem illorum quos morali, aut evidenti certitudine constat esse episcopos, esse legitimam congregationem, et Concilium in quo auctoritative sit Ecclesia quia ut si legitimum Concilium ab auctoritate pontificis congregatum est. |  | **XXIV.** To the second objection, it is answered that in a congregation of bishops, if it is a General Council legitimately convened, it is a matter of faith that this congregation represents the Church and authoritatively constitutes the whole Church, in the same way that it is a matter of faith that it is a legitimate Council. For this, however, it is not necessary that it be a matter of faith that each bishop, or all bishops taken individually, are bishops, because none of them in particular, nor all of them taken individually, serve as the rule of faith. Rather, it is only a matter of faith that the congregation of those who, with moral or evident certainty, are known to be bishops, constitutes a legitimate congregation and a Council in which the Church is authoritatively present, because it is a legitimate Council convened by the authority of the pontiff. |
| XXV. Secundo arguitur ex parte causæ efficientis, id est, electorum, et electionis, quæ est causa efficiens elective papam, quia non constat de fide istos electores in particulari habere validam intentionem eligendi, et esse legitimos, ac veros cardinales, et servatam fuisse formam juridicam eligendi, ut scilicet a duabus partibus cardinalium sit electus: et cæteræ aliæ conditiones, sine quibus electio est nulla; hæc enim omnia servata fuisse non docet fides, nam quando promulgatur primo electio papæ non constat Ecclesiæ acceptanti per aliquam revelationem, vel traditionem, vel ex alia via, quibus res fidei nobis proponuntur, quod omnes illæ conditiones servatæ sint, sed illæ tantum habentur in fide ipsorum electorum promulgantium electionem, ergo nunquam certificatur Ecclesia certitudine fidei de ipso electo, quod legitime electus sit. |  | **XXV.** Second, one argues from the perspective of the efficient cause, that is, of the electors and the election, which is the efficient cause that electively produces the pope, because it is not established by faith that these particular electors have a valid intention of electing, and that they are legitimate and true cardinals, and that the juridical form of election was observed, namely that he was elected by two-thirds of the cardinals; and other conditions without which the election is null. Faith does not teach that all these things were observed, for when the election of a pope is first promulgated, it is not established for the Church that accepts him—through any revelation, or tradition, or by any other means by which matters of faith are proposed to us—that all those conditions were observed, but these are held only on the testimony of the electors who promulgate the election. Therefore, the Church is never certified with the certainty of faith regarding the one elected, that he was legitimately elected. |
| XXVI. Confirmatur, nam acceptatio Ecclesiæ circa aliquam propositionem non facit illam de fide, nisi acceptet illam tamquam de fide; ut autem acceptetur de fide, oportet quod ab aliquo proponente proponatur Ecclesiæ tamquam de fide, sed hoc non fit in præsenti propositione: ergo illa non est habenda tamquam de fide. Minor probatur, nam electus, et electio proponitur Ecclesiae ab ipsis electoribus, de quorum electione, et conditionibus in ea servatis non constat apud alios, cum ipsi inter se tractent de illa electione seorsum. Electores autem nec proponunt illam electionem tamquam de fide, neque in re fidei proponenda habent auctoritatem infallibilem, quae solum Petro, et ejus successoribus est promissa, non electoribus; ergo ex vi talis propositionis, et acceptationis Ecclesiae, adhuc non est certum de fide illum electum esse papam. |  | **XXVI.** This is confirmed, for the Church’s acceptance of any proposition does not make it a matter of faith, unless the Church accepts it as a matter of faith; but for it to be accepted as a matter of faith, it must be proposed to the Church as a matter of faith by some proponent. However, this does not occur in the present proposition. Therefore, it should not be considered a matter of faith. The minor premise is proven, for the elect and the election are proposed to the Church by the electors themselves, of whose election and the conditions observed therein others have no knowledge, since they conduct the proceedings of that election among themselves in private. The electors, however, neither propose that election as a matter of faith, nor do they possess infallible authority in proposing a matter of faith, which was promised only to Peter and his successors, not to the electors. Therefore, by virtue of such a proposition and the Church’s acceptance, it is still not certain as a matter of faith that the one elected is the pope. |
| XXVII. Quod si dicas, non proponere electores istam propositionem Ecclesiae, ut credendam, sed tantum declarare personam electam, ipsum vero pontificem quam primum aliquid definit, vel determinat hoc ipso seipsum proponit ut regulam vivam, et caput supremum Ecclesiae; sed contra est, nam antequam pontifex definiat, hoc ipso quo est electus, non minus debet esse certum quod sit papa, quam postquam definit, si quidem etiam ante quamcumque definitionem, aut actum quem exerceat, est caput visibile Ecclesiae pacifico electum, ita quod Ecclesia tenetur habere unionem cum illo, et non esset vera Ecclesia, sed schismatica, quae illum non acceptaret, ergo oportet quod ante omnem actum ab ipsomet pontifice procedentem, sit fundamentum aliquod certitudinis fidei circa illam propositionem, et consequenter ab aliquo proponente infallibili proponatur tamquam de fide: hoc autem non datur, cum solum proponatur ab electoribus, qui non habent auctoritatem regulae infallibilis circa aliquam propositionem de fide, nec enim majorem auctoritatem habent, quam Concilium generale ante definitionem papae, quod tamen errare potest, praesertim si non omnes conveniant, aut instructionem pontificis sequantur, nec illam electionem proponunt tamquam de fide tenendam, quod sit rite facta: ergo. |  | **XXVII.** But if you should say that the electors do not propose this proposition to the Church as something to be believed, but merely declare the person elected, and that the pontiff himself, as soon as he defines or determines anything, by that very act proposes himself as the living rule and supreme head of the Church; against this is the fact that before the pontiff defines anything, by the very fact that he is elected, it should be no less certain that he is pope than after he defines something. Indeed, even before any definition or act that he might perform, he is the visible head of the Church peacefully elected, such that the Church is bound to maintain union with him, and any church that would not accept him would not be the true Church, but schismatic. Therefore, it is necessary that before any act proceeding from the pontiff himself, there be some foundation of certainty of faith concerning that proposition, and consequently that it be proposed as a matter of faith by some infallible proposer. However, this is not given, since it is only proposed by the electors, who do not have the authority of an infallible rule concerning any proposition of faith, for they have no greater authority than a general Council before the definition of the pope, which nevertheless can err, especially if not all agree or follow the instruction of the pontiff, nor do they propose that election as something to be held as a matter of faith, that it was duly performed: therefore. |
| Si dicas constare de istis conditionibus Ecclesia, non ex declaratione, aut propositione electorum, sed ex ipsa evidentia facti, quia non apparet electionem illam non esse pacificam, et ideo sic illam acceptat Ecclesia, contra est, quia nullus praeter electores videt omnes illas conditiones, quae a jure statutae sunt observari, sed id apud illos secretum est; ergo id non constat Ecclesiae acceptanti ex evidentia facti, sed ex electorum declaratione. Et licet appareat pacifica esse electio, non tamen apparet, an sit pacifica ex vera observatione omnium conditionum, vel ex inadvertentia electorum, aut ex conventione ipsorum, ut decipiant proponendo tamquam legitime electum non electum, aut cum aliqua simonia procedendo, etc. Nec dici potest Deum non permissurum, ut Ecclesia in tali casu decipiatur. Hoc enim et si pie credendum sit, tamen non est aliqua infallibilis promissio de hoc, nec est de fide id Deum nunquam permissurum, praesertim cum receptissimum fuerit in Ecclesia, et a multis approbatum, quod femina quaedam fuerit electa in pontificem, in quo casu etiam admitti debebat posse electionem pacificam, et ab Ecclesia acceptatam, continere errorem invalidantem illam, et consequenter non est certum de fide, Deum non permittere aliquando, ut Ecclesia in recipiendo electionem, et electores in proponendo illam pacifice, errent; si enim hoc esset de fide, etiam esset de fide illam historiam de femina pontifice esse falsam, quod nemo dicit. |  | If you should say that these conditions are known to the Church not from the declaration or proposition of the electors, but from the very evidence of the fact, because it does not appear that the election was not peaceful, and therefore the Church thus accepts it—against this is the fact that no one besides the electors sees all those conditions which are established by law to be observed, but that remains secret among them; therefore this is not known to the accepting Church from the evidence of the fact, but from the declaration of the electors. And although the election may appear to be peaceful, it nevertheless does not appear whether it is peaceful from the true observance of all conditions, or from the inadvertence of the electors, or from their agreement to deceive by proposing as legitimately elected one who was not elected, or by proceeding with some simony, etc. Nor can it be said that God would not permit the Church to be deceived in such a case. For although this may be piously believed, there is nevertheless no infallible promise about this, nor is it a matter of faith that God would never permit this, especially since it was widely received in the Church, and approved by many, that a certain woman was once elected as pontiff, in which case it also had to be admitted that a peaceful election, accepted by the Church, could contain an error invalidating it, and consequently it is not certain as a matter of faith that God does not sometimes permit the Church, in receiving an election, and the electors, in peacefully proposing it, to err; for if this were a matter of faith, it would also be a matter of faith that the history of the female pontiff was false, which no one claims. |
| XXVIII. Respondetur de illis omnibus conditionibus, et de intentione, ac veritate electorum non constare de fide immediate, quia non versatur immediate circa ista acceptatio, et definitio Ecclesiæ, sed constat mediate, et per consequentiam; immediate autem constat de fide, quod electus ab illis personis, quæ sunt ab Ecclesia designatæ ad hoc ministerium, et in persona ejus eligunt pontificem, hoc ipso quod ab Ecclesia acceptatur, ut legitime electus sit pontifex, quia circa hoc versatur definitio Martini V supra posita, et Ecclesiæ acceptatio. Ex hoc autem mediate, et per consequentiam infertur, quod si est de fide istum electum esse pontificem, quod omnia ad id requisita servata sunt: non vero primo per se fides versatur circa ipsa requisita, et conditiones in electoribus concurrentes, et deinde circa ipsum electum. Sicut etiam in definitionibus Conciliorum fides non versatur circa ea, quæ ad talem definitionem prærequiruntur, videlicet quod præcesserit diligens inquisitio, aut disputatio circa propositiones definiendas, de hoc enim non datur fides, sed tamen facta definitione, recte infertur per consequentiam theologicam omnia requisita ad definitionem posita fuisse, et consequenter disputationem illam præcessisse. Et hujus ratio est, quia quando aliquid per se est de fide, non est necesse quod sint etiam de fide ea, quæ necessariam connexionem habent cum tali veritate de fide, imo in hoc consistit conclusio theologica, quod versatur circa ea, quæ necessariam connexionem, et consequentiam habent cum his, quæ de fide sunt, sicut est conclusio theologica: Christus est homo; ergo Christus est risibilis, quia risibilitas habet necessariam connexionem cum homine. Similiter cum sit de fide, quod hic homo in particulari canonice electus secundum acceptationem Ecclesiæ sit pontifex, infertur per consequentiam theologicam quod a veris electoribus, et per veram intentionem sit electus, et cætera alia requisita sine quibus illa veritas stare non potest. Itaque per fidem, seu revelationem implicite contentam in symbolo, et in promissione facta Petro, et explicitam amplius in definitione Martini V et applicatam, ac declaratam in exercitio per acceptationem Ecclesiæ, solum constat quod hic electus in particulari canonice secundum acceptationem Ecclesiæ sit pontifex: reliqua autem quæ necessario prærequiruntur, aut sequuntur ex tali electione, per theologicam consequentiam inferuntur ex illa propositione de fide, et mediate creduntur. |  | **XXVIII.** We respond that regarding all those conditions, and the intention and truthfulness of the electors, these are not immediately known by faith, because the acceptance and definition of the Church is not immediately concerned with these matters, but they are known mediately and by consequence. What is immediately known by faith is that one who is elected by those persons designated by the Church for this ministry, who elect the pontiff in her person, by the very fact that he is accepted by the Church as legitimately elected, is the pontiff. This is because the definition of Martin V stated above, and the Church’s acceptance, are concerned with this matter. From this, mediately and by consequence, it is inferred that if it is a matter of faith that this elected person is the pontiff, then all things required for this have been observed. But faith is not primarily and per se concerned with the requirements themselves and the conditions present in the electors, and then subsequently with the elected person himself. Similarly, in the definitions of Councils, faith is not concerned with those things that are prerequisites for such a definition, namely that diligent inquiry or disputation concerning the propositions to be defined has preceded it. Faith is not given concerning this, but nevertheless, once the definition is made, it is rightly inferred through theological consequence that all requirements for the definition were in place, and consequently that the disputation preceded it. And the reason for this is that when something is per se a matter of faith, it is not necessary that those things which have a necessary connection with such a truth of faith are also matters of faith. Indeed, a theological conclusion consists in this: that it deals with those things which have a necessary connection and consequence with those things which are of faith. For example, it is a theological conclusion that “Christ is a man; therefore Christ can laugh,” because the ability to laugh has a necessary connection with being human. Similarly, since it is a matter of faith that this particular man canonically elected according to the acceptance of the Church is the pontiff, it is inferred by theological consequence that he was elected by true electors, with true intention, and that all other requisites without which that truth cannot stand were present. Thus, through faith or revelation implicitly contained in the creed and in the promise made to Peter, and made more explicit in the definition of Martin V, and applied and declared in practice through the acceptance of the Church, it is only established that this particular person canonically elected according to the acceptance of the Church is the pontiff. The other things that are necessarily prerequisite to or follow from such an election are inferred by theological consequence from that proposition of faith, and are believed mediately. |
| XXIX. Ad confirmationem respondetur, Ecclesiam acceptare tamquam de fide electionem, et electum, quatenus acceptat illum, ut regulam infallibilem fidei, et ut caput supremum, cui unitur, et ex cujus unione cum ipso pendet unitas Ecclesiæ. Et quando dicitur, quod debet id ab aliquo proponente Ecclesiæ proponi respondetur illam electionem, et electum proponi a cardinalibus non in persona propria, sed in persona, et virtute Ecclesiæ, a qua commissa est eis potestas eligendi, et declarandi electum. Unde ipsi in hac parte, et quoad hoc munus sunt ipsa Ecclesia repræsentative, sicut enim episcopi congregati legitime a papa, sunt repræsentative Ecclesia, sic cardinales, vel cuicumque alii electores legitime designati ab Ecclesia, seu a papa, sunt repræsentative Ecclesia in ordine ad eligendum caput Ecclesiæ, et successorem Petri: et sicut pontifex ita congregat episcopos in Concilio, quod ab ipso pendet confirmatio, et ultima sententia in rebus fidei, sic congregatio cardinalium, sic eligit, et declarat electum pontificem, quod Ecclesia acceptando, cujus ipsi sunt ministri, ultimate confirmat tamquam de fide illum hominem esse vere regulam supremam fidei, et summum pontificem. Unde si dubie eligant cardinales, Ecclesia corrigere potest eorum electionem, sicut determinatum est in Concilio Constantiensi sessione XLI. Quare etiam ante omnem definitionem ipsius pontificis ex sola Ecclesiæ acceptatione redditur de fide illa propositio, sicut explicatum est, non propter acceptationem Ecclesiæ quomodocumque, sed in materia pertinente ad fidem, cum acceptetur ut regula determinata fidei. Et quando dicitur, quod de conditionibus requisitis ad electionem nihil videtur exterius, sed solum id fit penes electores in quorum declaratione, et dicto acceptat Ecclesia pontificem, respondetur non requiri quod omnes illæ conditiones, et ipsa electio, ac intentio eligentium videantur, sed supponantur factæ morali modo, quia vident electores ad actum electionis congregari, et pacifice proponere electum, ac declarare nullo dubio rationabili interveniente; hoc enim sufficit, ut Ecclesia universaliter acceptet illum, et hac acceptatione facta redditur de fide illa veritas: non enim requiritur ut aliquid sit de fide, quod omnes conditiones ad id prærequisitæ videantur, sed sufficit quod antecedenter morali certitudine constent, et postea per theologicam consequentiam de eis certitudo habeatur. |  | **XXIX.** To the confirmation it is answered that the Church accepts as a matter of faith both the election and the elected, insofar as it accepts him as the infallible rule of faith and as the supreme head to whom it is united, and upon whose union with the Church depends the unity of the Church itself. And when it is said that this must be proposed to the Church by some proposer, it is answered that the election and the elected are proposed by the Cardinals not in their own person, but in the person and by the authority of the Church, by which the power of electing and declaring the elected has been entrusted to them. Hence, in this regard and with respect to this office, they are the Church representatively, for just as bishops legitimately assembled by the Pope are the Church representatively, so too the Cardinals, or whatever other electors legitimately designated by the Church or by the Pope, are the Church representatively for the purpose of electing the head of the Church and the successor of Peter. And just as the Pontiff so assembles the bishops in Council that the confirmation and final judgment in matters of faith depends on him, so too the congregation of Cardinals so elects and declares the elected Pontiff that the Church, by accepting him—of which Cardinals they are ministers—ultimately confirms as a matter of faith that this man is truly the supreme rule of faith and the Supreme Pontiff. Hence, if the Cardinals elect doubtfully, the Church can correct their election, as was determined in the Council of Constance, session XLI. Therefore, even before any definition by the Pontiff himself, through the Church’s acceptance alone that proposition becomes a matter of faith, as has been explained—not because of the Church’s acceptance in any manner whatsoever, but in a matter pertaining to faith, since he is accepted as the determined rule of faith. And when it is said that nothing of the conditions required for election is seen externally, but this happens only among the electors in whose declaration and statement the Church accepts the Pontiff, it is answered that it is not required that all those conditions, and the election itself, and the intention of the electors be seen, but they are assumed to have been done in a moral way, because they see the electors gathered for the act of election, and peacefully proposing the elected, and declaring him without any reasonable doubt intervening; for this suffices for the Church to universally accept him, and once this acceptance is made, that truth becomes a matter of faith. For it is not required that something be a matter of faith, that all conditions prerequisite to it be seen, but it suffices that they be established with moral certainty beforehand, and afterwards certainty concerning them is had through theological consequence. |
| XXX. Explico hoc. Nam quando aliquis sanctus canonizatur, aut aliqua propositio de fide definitur, aut aliquis liber acceptatur in canonicum, necesse est quod præcedat inquisitio sufficiens, et de illa inquisitione ante actum canonizationis, vel definitionis non nisi morali certitudine, aut naturali evidentia constat quod fiat, et hoc sufficit ut possit definitio fieri; ea vero facta, cum sit de fide talis definitio, redditur per consequentiam theologicam certum quod omnes conditiones requisitæ fuerunt adhibitæ, ut explicatum est, cum habeant connexionem cum tali veritate, quæ est de fide: sicut in reliquis omnibus veritatibus fidei, ea quæ sunt necesario cum illis connexa certa esse debent, non tamen de fide, sed solum theologice, ut conclusiones illatæ. Ita in præsenti antecedenter ad electionem, solum morali certitudine constat adhiberi conditiones requisitas, et per se necessarias ad legitimam electionem. Illa vero acceptata, est conclusio theologica, quod illæ conditiones sint adhibitæ, quia habent necessariam connexionem, et per se sunt requisitæ ad talem veritatem fidei. |  | **XXX.** I explain this. For when any saint is canonized, or any proposition is defined as a matter of faith, or any book is accepted as canonical, it is necessary that a sufficient investigation precedes, and concerning that investigation before the act of canonization or definition, it is established only with moral certainty or natural evidence that it occurs, and this suffices for the definition to be made. Once that definition is made, since such a definition is a matter of faith, it becomes certain through theological consequence that all required conditions were applied, as has been explained, since they have a connection with such a truth which is of faith. Just as in all other truths of faith, those things which are necessarily connected with them must be certain, yet not as matters of faith, but only theologically, as inferred conclusions. Thus in the present matter, prior to the election, it is established only with moral certainty that the conditions required and necessarily essential for a legitimate election are applied. Once the election is accepted, it is a theological conclusion that those conditions were applied, because they have a necessary connection and are per se required for such a truth of faith. |
| XXXI. Quod vero additur fuisse a pluribus in Ecclesia receptum, quamdam feminam fuisse pontificem, qui tamen nihil contra fidem, aut theologicam conclusionem sentiebant in hoc respondetur, quod attinet ad rem illam historiam esse falsam, ut his temporibus manifeste ostensum est, de quo videri potest Baronius, Bellarminus, et reliqui auctores agentes de Romano pontifice, et de hoc edidit libellum quemdam Flori mundus Romundus, ubi satis accurate imposturam hanc detegit. Quod vero aliqui sine nota erroris id crediderint non obstat, quia excusantur ignorantia putantes id solum pertinere ad historiæ narrationem. Si tamen advertent se dicere quod Ecclesia pacifice acceptavit ut pontificem personam illam, quæ veræ erat incapax, et non pontifex, certe non excusaretur ab errore, quia diceret ex consequenti Ecclesiam errare posse in acceptando in regulam fidei supremam illum, qui vere regula non est, nec illius est capax. Unde non solum pie creditur, sed etiam per consequentiam theologicam infertur, Deum non permissurum quod eligatur, et acceptetur pacifice ab Ecclesia qui vere non habet conditiones ad id requisitas, et necessarias, ut declaratum est, quia id necessario pertinet ad specialem Dei providentiam, et assistentiam Spiritus sancti circa Ecclesiam. |  | **XXXI.** As for what is added that it was accepted by many in the Church that a certain woman was pontiff—though they held nothing contrary to faith or theological conclusion in this—the response is, concerning this matter, that the historical account is false, as has been clearly demonstrated in these times, about which one may consult Baronius, Bellarminus, and other authors who address the Roman pontiff; and on this matter Florimond de Raemond published a certain book, wherein he quite thoroughly exposes this imposture. That some believed this without the mark of error is no obstacle, because they are excused by ignorance, thinking it pertained only to historical narrative. If, however, they were to realize that they were asserting that the Church peacefully accepted as pontiff a person who was truly incapable and not a pontiff, certainly they would not be excused from error, because they would consequently be saying that the Church could err in accepting as the supreme rule of faith one who truly is not the rule, nor capable of being such. Hence it is not only piously believed, but also inferred through theological consequence, that God would not permit someone to be elected and peacefully accepted by the Church who truly does not possess the conditions required and necessary for this, as has been declared, because this necessarily pertains to God’s special providence and the assistance of the Holy Spirit concerning the Church. |
| XXXII. Tertio arguitur ex parte causæ materialis, quæ est subjectum recipiens in se per electionem dignitatem pontificiam, etenim non est certum secundum fidem subjectam hoc est capax talis dignitatis; ergo neque est certum de fide illi defacto convenire. Consequentia patet, quia sicut supponitur necessario factam esse legitimam electionem, ut sit de facto hunc in particulari esse papam, ita supponitur necessario hunc habere capacitatem requisitam ad talem dignitatem; ergo quamdiu non certificamur de ista capacitate semper manebit incertum circa applicationem dignitatis ad hoc subjectum, nam in bona consequentia si consequens est contingens, antecedens non potest esse necessarium, hæc est autem bona consequentia: Iste homo est summus pontifex; ergo est baptizatus; ergo si consequens est contingens, etiam et antecedens, et sic non est certum immediate de fide. Antecedens autem argumenti constat, quia non est de fide istum hominem in particulari esse baptizatum, aut esse virum, et cæteras conditiones habere, si quidem usque ad instans electionis id non erat de fide, facta autem electione, non advenit nova revelatio, aut definitio declarans istum in particulari esse baptizatum, aut aliqua Ecclesiæ traditio; ergo id non incipit esse de fide. Quod si dicatur pendere hanc veritatem ex illis conditionibus tamquam ab aliquo requisito, quod non est necesse esse de fide, contra est, quia illa veritas quod iste in particulari sit pontifex pendet ab hoc quod est esse rite electum, et a reliquis veritatibus, ut a praemissis, ex quibus infertur; ergo non solum ut a conditione requisita extrinsece, sed ut ab antecedenti influente per se in veritatem consequentis. |  | **XXXII.** Thirdly, an argument is made regarding the material cause, which is the subject receiving the pontifical dignity through election; for it is not certain as a matter of faith that this subject is capable of such dignity; therefore, neither is it certain as a matter of faith that it actually belongs to him. The consequence is evident, because just as it is necessarily supposed that a legitimate election has taken place for it to be the case that this particular person is the pope, so it is necessarily supposed that this person has the required capacity for such dignity. Therefore, as long as we are not made certain about this capacity, uncertainty will always remain regarding the application of the dignity to this subject. For in a valid inference, if the consequent is contingent, the antecedent cannot be necessary. This is a valid inference: “This man is the Supreme Pontiff; therefore, he is baptized.” Therefore, if the consequent is contingent, the antecedent is also contingent, and thus it is not immediately certain as a matter of faith. The antecedent of the argument is established because it is not a matter of faith that this particular man is baptized, or that he is male, or that he possesses the other required conditions. Indeed, up to the moment of election, this was not a matter of faith, and after the election, no new revelation or definition comes forth declaring that this particular person is baptized, nor is there any tradition of the Church to this effect. Therefore, it does not begin to be a matter of faith. But if it should be said that this truth depends on those conditions as on something requisite, which need not be a matter of faith, the counter-argument is that the truth that this particular person is pontiff depends on his being properly elected and on the other truths as on premises from which it is inferred. Therefore, it depends not only as on an extrinsically required condition, but as on an antecedent that influences per se the truth of the consequent. |
| XXXIII. Et confirmatur primo, quia si aliqua definitione inciperet esse de fide, quod hic homo in particulari est baptizatus, necesse erat quod aliqua inquisitio praecessisset circa hanc materiam in particulari, ut illa censeretur manere definita; sicut ut maneat definitum quod iste homo in particulari est beatus, necesse est quod plures diligentiae, et inquisitio magna praecedat, nulla autem fit inquisitio, aut diligentia ad hoc sciendum, ut constat; ergo non habetur illa veritas ex vi alicujus definitionis; solum ergo restat quod habeatur ex traditione Ecclesiae, aut revelatione. Ridiculum autem est dicere in traditione Ecclesiae fuisse contentum, quod hic homo Innocentius X fuit baptizatus, revelatio autem nulla est facta; ergo. Confirmatur secundo, nam non est certum secundum fidem hanc personam habere potestatem ordinis episcopalem; ergo neque potestatem jurisdictionis. Consequentia patet, quia ut sit de fide hunc hominem esse papam universalis Ecclesiae debet esse de fide, quod sit episcopus Romanus, et quod habeat episcopalem dignitatem quae constat ex potestate ordinis, et jurisdictionis. Antecedens autem probatur, quia si in papam eligatur ille qui non est episcopus, consecratur, et suscipit characterem episcopalem sicut alii episcopi, nec magis est de fide ipsum suscipere characterem in tali consecratione, quam reliqui episcopi; si autem ante pontificatum id suscepit multo minus est certum; ergo. |  | **XXXIII.** And it is confirmed firstly, because if it were to become a matter of faith by some definition that this particular man is baptized, it would have been necessary for some investigation to have preceded regarding this particular matter, so that it might be considered to remain defined; just as for it to remain defined that this particular man is blessed, it is necessary that multiple diligent inquiries and great investigation precede. However, no investigation or diligent inquiry is made for knowing this, as is evident; therefore, that truth is not held by virtue of any definition. It remains only that it is held from the tradition of the Church or by revelation. But it is ridiculous to say that it was contained in the tradition of the Church that this man, Innocent X, was baptized, and no revelation has been made; therefore [it cannot be a matter of faith]. It is confirmed secondly, for it is not certain according to faith that this person has the power of episcopal orders; therefore, neither [is it certain that he has] the power of jurisdiction. The consequence is evident, because for it to be a matter of faith that this man is the pope of the universal Church, it must be a matter of faith that he is the Roman bishop, and that he has episcopal dignity which consists of the power of orders and of jurisdiction. The antecedent, however, is proven because if someone who is not a bishop is elected pope, he is consecrated and receives the episcopal character just like other bishops, nor is it more a matter of faith that he receives the character in such consecration than it is for other bishops; if, however, he received it before his pontificate, it is even less certain; therefore [it is not a matter of faith that the pope has the power of episcopal orders]. |
| XXXIV. Respondetur similiter sicut ad præcedens, quod omnes illæ conditiones ex parte personæ eligendæ requisitæ antecedenter ad electionem supponuntur ut notæ certitudine morali, facta autem, et acceptata electione redduntur necessariæ secundum consequentiam theologicam, quia habent connexionem per se cum veritate certa, et certificata per fidem. Et quando dicitur, quod in bona consequentia si antecedens est contingens, consequens non potest esse necessarium, fatemur; cæterum illud consequens: Hic homo est baptizatus, vel est vir, aut est ordinatus, et cæteras conditiones habens ad pontificatum postquam ille est acceptatus ab Ecclesia in papam, non est consequens contingens, sed conclusio theologica necessario illata ex una de fide : sicut facta definitione circa aliquam veritatem, non est contingens, sed necessarium consequens quod præcesserit inquisitio necessaria ad talem definitionem faciendam. Et licet illa propositio : Hic homo est baptizatus absolute sumpta, et secundum se, sit contingens, tamen ut subest illi propositioni : Hic homo est pontifex, et ab illa deducitur, redditur necessaria; sicut illa propositio : Petrus peccabit, absolute est contingens, tamen ut subest, et deducitur ex illa : Deus scit Petrum peccaturum est necessaria, seu infallibilis, ut docet D. Thomas, I p. quæst. xiv, art. xiii. |  | **XXXIV.** The response is similar to the preceding one, namely that all those conditions required on the part of the person to be elected are presupposed as known with moral certainty prior to the election. Once the election has been conducted and accepted, however, these conditions become necessary according to theological consequentiality, because they have an intrinsic connection with a truth that is certain and certified through faith. And when it is said that in valid logical reasoning, if the antecedent is contingent, the consequent cannot be necessary, we acknowledge this. Nevertheless, the consequent proposition “This man is baptized,” or “is a man,” or “is ordained,” and having the other conditions required for the pontificate after he has been accepted by the Church as pope, is not a contingent consequent, but a theological conclusion necessarily inferred from a matter of faith. This is similar to how, once a definition has been made concerning some truth, it is not contingent but necessary that the investigation required for making such a definition preceded it. And although the proposition “This man is baptized,” taken absolutely and in itself, is contingent, nevertheless as it is subsumed under the proposition “This man is pontiff,” and is deduced from it, it becomes necessary—just as the proposition “Peter will sin” is in itself contingent, yet as it is subsumed under and deduced from “God knows that Peter will sin,” it becomes necessary or infallible, as St. Thomas teaches in the First Part, question 14, article 13. |
| XXXV. Ad primam confirmationem respondetur, quod quando aliqua veritas immediate in particulari definitur, circa illam debet præcedere inquisitio ; quando vero aliquid non definitur immediate, sed definitur aliquid cum quo aliud habet necessariam connexionem, non est necesse quod præcedat inquisitio circa illud, quod est conjunctum, et connexum ei, sed circa illud quod immediate definitur. Nunc autem veritas quæ definitur, et acceptatur ab Ecclesia immediate, non est, quod hic homo sit baptizatus, aut ordinatus, etc. sed quod sit vere pontifex, et regula fidei, et de hoc sufficiens inquisitio virtualiter præcedit, dum constat esse electum, et proponi toti Ecclesiæ ut canonice factum. Quod vero sit baptizatus, et cæteras conditiones habeat, non de fide tenetur, nec definitur ab Ecclesia, sed per consequentiam infertur; ut autem aliquid inferatur per consequentiam non est necesse quod fiat circa illud inquisitio. Ad secundam confirmationem respondetur, quod hunc hominem esse ordinatum, et habere potestatem ordinis, sive sacerdotii, sive episcopatus, constat eodem modo, sicut esse baptizatum, scilicet non de fide immediate, sed per consequentiam theologicam, tamquam aliquid connexum necessario cum illa veritate: Quod iste homo sit pontifex, et regula fidei in Ecclesia, quod non habet per potestatem ordinis præcise, licet ad id requiratur. |  | **XXXV.** To the first confirmation, it is answered that when some truth is immediately defined in particular, an inquiry should precede concerning it; but when something is not defined immediately, but rather something is defined with which another thing has a necessary connection, it is not necessary that an inquiry precede concerning that which is conjoined and connected to it, but only concerning that which is immediately defined. Now, the truth which is defined and accepted by the Church immediately is not that this man is baptized, or ordained, etc., but that he is truly the pontiff and the rule of faith, and about this a sufficient virtual inquiry precedes, while it is established that he has been elected and presented to the whole Church as canonically done. That he is baptized and possesses the other conditions is not held as a matter of faith, nor is it defined by the Church, but is inferred by consequence; and for something to be inferred by consequence, it is not necessary that an inquiry be made concerning it. To the second confirmation, it is answered that this man being ordained and having the power of orders, whether of priesthood or episcopate, is established in the same way as being baptized, namely not immediately as a matter of faith, but by theological consequence, as something necessarily connected with that truth: That this man is the pontiff and the rule of faith in the Church, which he does not possess precisely through the power of orders, although this is required for it. |
| XXXVI. Quarto arguitur: Ex parte causæ formalis, quia cum ista veritas non sit in particulari revelata, aut tradita, aut definita, solum potest reddi de fide, vel ex vi electionis pacificæ, vel ex acceptatione Ecclesiæ, vel ex aliquo actu, quem ipse pontifex tamquam pontifex exercet, vel ex ipsa universali propositione: Quod omnis rite electus est pontifex, supponendo tamquam conditionem naturaliter notam quod iste sit electus pacifice, et acceptatus; nam ut aliqua propositio sit de fide, multæ conditiones supponi solent, quæ tamen de fide non sunt, sed solum naturali, aut morali certitudine habentur. Sicut ut aliqua propositio sit definita, supponitur quod sit facta sufficiens inquisitio circa illam, non tamen hæc inquisitio, aut disputatio constat de fide, quod facta sit: et ut credam aliquid contentum in sacra Scriptura tamquam de fide, supponitur hunc librum in particulari, aut illum continere sacram Scripturam, non tamen est de fide hunc librum in particulari, quem teneo continere sacram Scripturam, et esse bibliam. Quod ergo ex nullo istorum modorum constet hunc in particulari esse papam, probari potest. Nam primo modo scilicet ex vi electionis pacifice factæ id esse non potest: nam quod ista electio sit pacifice facta, et cum omnibus debitis circumstantiis, non constat per aliquam revelationem, aut definitionem, nec ipsa publicatio electionis pacificæ a cardinalibus facta est æquivalens definitioni, cum nullibi sit illi promissa infallibilis ratio regulandi rem fidei, et licet illam haberet, non haberet majorem potestatem circa hoc quam Concilium generale, quod tamen nisi confirmetur per pontificem, non habet infallibilem auctoritatem; ergo similiter illa declaratio pacificæ electionis, nisi confirmetur per papam, non erit regula infallibilis fidei; certum est autem id non confirmari, quia nullus est qui possit electionem papæ confirmare, nec ipse electus suam electionem confirmat, aut eam legitime factam esse declarat; et si faceret jam certitudo istius veritatis non ad ipsam electionem, sed ad actum quem pontifex exercet, reduceretur; ergo ex vi præcise electionis non constat hunc in particulari electum esse papam. Secundo modo, scilicet ex acceptatione Ecclesiæ id etiam non convincitur, nam acceptatio Ecclesiæ ut sic non facit aliquid esse de fide, nisi quando acceptat aliquid tamquam materiam de fide; Ecclesia enim acceptat jejunium quadragesimæ, et jejunium vigiliarum, et omnes alias cæremonias cultus divini, nec tamen illa omnia facit esse de fide, ita ut qui negaret esse jejunium pro illis diebus, aut esse necessarias tales cæremonias, hæreticus esset; ergo similiter negare quod aliquis in particulari non sit electus in pontificem rite, et consequenter quod non sit papa, non erit contra fidem, unde cum Ecclesiæ non proponatur electio illa ut credenda, sed ut obedienda, consequenter neque acceptat illam tamquam materiam de fide, sed ut materiam obedientiæ; præterquam quod non omnis Ecclesia illam acceptat tamquam de fide, cum aliqui inter catholicos sentiant non esse de fide: ergo. |  | **XXXVI.** Fourth, it is argued: From the perspective of the formal cause, since this truth is not particularly revealed, handed down by tradition, or defined, it can only be rendered a matter of faith either by virtue of a peaceful election, or by the Church’s acceptance, or by some act which the pontiff himself exercises as pontiff, or from the universal proposition itself: That every person duly elected is pontiff, presupposing as a naturally known condition that this person has been peacefully elected and accepted; for when a proposition is held to be of faith, many conditions are usually presupposed which are nevertheless not matters of faith themselves, but are held only with natural or moral certainty. Just as for a proposition to be defined, it is presupposed that sufficient inquiry concerning it has been made, yet this inquiry or disputation is not established as a matter of faith; and for me to believe something contained in Sacred Scripture as a matter of faith, it is presupposed that this or that particular book contains Sacred Scripture, yet it is not a matter of faith that this particular book which I hold contains Sacred Scripture and is the Bible. That from none of these modes can it be established that this particular person is pope can be proven. For in the first mode, namely by virtue of a peacefully conducted election, this cannot be, because that this election was peacefully conducted and with all due circumstances is not established by any revelation or definition, nor is the public announcement of the peaceful election made by the cardinals equivalent to a definition, since nowhere has the infallible capacity for regulating a matter of faith been promised to them, and even if they had it, they would not have greater power in this matter than a General Council, which nevertheless does not have infallible authority unless confirmed by the pontiff; therefore, similarly, that declaration of peaceful election, unless confirmed by the pope, will not be an infallible rule of faith; it is certain, however, that this is not confirmed, because there is no one who can confirm the election of a pope, nor does the elected person himself confirm his election or declare it to have been legitimately conducted; and if he did, the certainty of this truth would be reduced not to the election itself, but to the act which the pontiff exercises; therefore, by virtue of the election precisely, it is not established that this particular elected person is pope. In the second mode, namely from the Church’s acceptance, this is also not proven, for the acceptance of the Church as such does not make something a matter of faith, except when it accepts something as a matter of faith; for the Church accepts the Lenten fast, and the fasts of vigils, and all other ceremonies of divine worship, yet it does not make all these matters of faith, such that one who denied there was a fast for those days, or that such ceremonies were necessary, would be a heretic; therefore, similarly, to deny that someone in particular has not been duly elected as pontiff, and consequently that he is not pope, will not be against the faith, wherefore since that election is not proposed to the Church as something to be believed, but as something to be obeyed, consequently it does not accept it as a matter of faith, but as a matter of obedience; apart from the fact that not the entire Church accepts it as a matter of faith, since some among Catholics hold that it is not a matter of faith: therefore. |
| XXXVII. Tertio modo similiter dici non potest quod habeatur certitudo hujus propositionis tamquam de fide, nam antequam pontifex electus quemcumque actum exerceat, hoc ipso quod electus est, Ecclesia tenetur illum acceptare tamquam legitimum caput, ita ut qui non acceptaverit habeatur pro schismatico; ergo non minus debet essecertum Ecclesiæ hanc personam esse papam, postquam exercet quemcumque actum quam ante, si quidem si non esset tunc certum quod iste homo in particulari esset papa, neque esset certum hanc Ecclesiam numero, quæ illum acceptat tamquam caput, et pastorem universalem, esse veram Ecclesiam, nam ut Ecclesia sit vera, debet esse unita vero suo, et legitimo pontifici, alias vera non erit. Quare si ante quemcumque actum pontificis est sufficiens obligatio acceptandi illum in papam, similiter erit sufficiens obligatio credendi, quod sit verus papa in particulari: et deinde quia priusquam pontifex aliquid definiat, ut ego assentiar veritati definitæ, debeo judicare quod iste qui definit est regula infallibilis fidei, quamdiu enim hoc judicium non formatur, neque possum esse certus de his, quae ipse definit; ideo enim dicimus quod debet esse de fide quod hic homo in particulari est summus pontifex, quia cum iste homo in particulari sit regula fidei, necesse est quod sit infallibile quod non possit errare, et quod habeat auctoritatem definiendi, ut infallibile sit id quod definit: necesse est ergo prius formare judicium quod hic sit summus pontifex in particulari, quam quod ego assentiar definitioni ab eo datae. Igitur definitio quam pontifex facit, vel actus quem exercet non potest esse ratio, et motivum assentiendi huic veritati, quod ipse sit pontifex, cum ad assentiendum tali definitioni praesupponi debeat quod ipse sit pontifex unde committeretur circulus, et petitio principii, si ideo assentior definitioni, quia assentior definientem esse papam, et si ideo assentior esse papam, quia definit. |  | **XXXVII.** In the third way, similarly, it cannot be said that there is certainty of this proposition as a matter of faith, for before the elected pontiff exercises any act whatsoever, by the very fact that he has been elected, the Church is bound to accept him as legitimate head, so that whoever does not accept him is regarded as schismatic. Therefore, the Church ought to be no less certain that this person is pope after he exercises any act than before, since if it were not then certain that this particular man was pope, neither would it be certain that this specific Church, which accepts him as head and universal pastor, is the true Church, for in order for the Church to be true, it must be united to its true and legitimate pontiff, otherwise it will not be true. Wherefore, if before any act of the pontiff there is sufficient obligation to accept him as pope, similarly there will be sufficient obligation to believe that he is the true pope in particular. And furthermore, before the pontiff defines anything, in order for me to assent to the defined truth, I must judge that he who defines is the infallible rule of faith, for as long as this judgment is not formed, I cannot be certain about those things which he defines. Therefore, we say that it must be a matter of faith that this particular man is the Supreme Pontiff, because since this particular man is the rule of faith, it is necessary that it be infallible that he cannot err, and that he has the authority to define, so that what he defines is infallible. It is therefore necessary to form the judgment that this is the Supreme Pontiff in particular before I assent to the definition given by him. Thus, the definition which the pontiff makes, or the act which he exercises, cannot be the reason and motive for assenting to this truth that he is the pontiff, since in order to assent to such a definition, it must be presupposed that he is the pontiff. Hence, a circular argument and begging the question would be committed if I assent to the definition because I assent that the one defining is the pope, and if I assent that he is the pope because he defines. |
| XXXVIII. Denique quarto modo non potest fieri de fide ista propositio, quod: Hic homo sit summus pontifex, quia si illo modo assentimur illi propositioni, non est differentia aliqua inter assensum, quem habeo de hac hostia, quod in ea sit corpus Christi, aut hic baptismus, quod sit verum sacramentum,quam de hoc homine rite electo, quod sit papa, nam etiam habetur de fide in communi, quod in omni hostia rite consecrata est corpus Christi, et tamquam conditio supponitur, quod ista sit rite consecrata certitudine quadam morali, seu evidentia saltem ab ipso qui consecrat: et de baptismo in communi credimus quod sit unum baptisma in remissionem peccatorum, et de hoc in particulari saltem ab eo qui baptizat, constat certitudine quadam morali, aut naturali, quod sit rite factum, et tamen hoc non sufficit, ut dicamus esse de fide, quod in hac hostia in particulari continetur Christus, aut hic baptismus est verum sacramentum; ergo si respectu pontificis, non habetur aliud principium quam illud universale, quod omnis rite electus est pontifex supponendo conditiones morali quadam certitudine, eodem modo illi assentimur, sicut et sacramentis in particulari. Item etiam quando formo istum syllogismum: Omnis rite electus est pontifex, hic homo est rite electus, ergo est pontifex, illa minor est distincta veritas, et distincta præmissa, a qua pendet veritas conclusionis per se loquendo; ergo non concurrit solum tamquam conditio requisita. In quo differt instantia allata de definitione alicujus veritatis fidei, quæ ut sit legitima præsupponitur tamquam conditio, quod sit facta sufficiens inquisitio, quia ex hoc quod sit facta sufficiens inquisitio, non per se pendet ratio legitima definitionis, sed ex eo quod ab habente infallibilem auctoritatem procedat; quod vero: Iste homo sit summus pontifex, per se pendet ab illa præmissa: Quod sit rite electus; ergo non se habet solum ut conditio. |  | **XXXVIII.** Finally, in the fourth manner, this proposition cannot be made a matter of faith, namely that: This man is the Supreme Pontiff, because if we assent to that proposition in that manner, there is no difference between the assent that I have regarding this host, that in it is the body of Christ, or this baptism, that it is a true sacrament, and regarding this properly elected man, that he is the pope. For it is also held as a matter of faith in general that in every properly consecrated host the body of Christ is present, and as a condition it is supposed, with a certain moral certitude, or at least with evidence from the one who consecrates, that this host is properly consecrated. And concerning baptism in general, we believe that there is one baptism for the remission of sins, and concerning this particular baptism, at least from the one who baptizes, it is established with a certain moral or natural certitude that it has been properly performed. And yet this does not suffice for us to say that it is a matter of faith that Christ is contained in this particular host, or that this baptism is a true sacrament. Therefore, if with respect to the pontiff, no other principle is held than that universal one—that everyone properly elected is pontiff—presupposing the conditions with a certain moral certitude, we assent to it in the same way as we do to sacraments in particular instances. Likewise, when I form this syllogism: Every properly elected man is pontiff; this man is properly elected; therefore, he is pontiff—that minor premise is a distinct truth and a distinct premise, upon which the truth of the conclusion depends when speaking per se. Therefore, it does not function merely as a required condition. In this it differs from the instance brought forth concerning the definition of some truth of faith, which, to be legitimate, presupposes as a condition that sufficient inquiry has been made. For the legitimate basis of definition does not per se depend on the fact that sufficient inquiry has been made, but on the fact that it proceeds from one having infallible authority. But that this man is the Supreme Pontiff depends per se on that premise: That he is properly elected. Therefore, it does not function merely as a condition. |
| XXXIX. Respondetur ex dictis. Fuerunt enim diversæ opiniones theologorum,quonam illorum modorum, qui in argumento referuntur, habeatur de fide hunc hominem in particulari esse pontificem. Et probabilius nobis visum est, quod facta acceptatione Ecclesiæ circa talem electionem, et electum eo ipso est de fide quod in particulari: Iste homo sit pontifex, licet id magis innotescat, et manifestetur quando ipse pontifex actum aliquem definitionis exercet. Et quando dicitur, quod Ecclesia non acceptat illam electionem, et electum, ut materiam fidei credendum, sed ut materiam obedientiæ, jam supra satis responsum est, quod acceptat illam materiam tamquam pertinentem ad fidem quia acceptat illum, ut regulam fidei infallibilem, quod fieri non potest, nisi sit de fide, quod ipse sic acceptatus vere regula fidei sit: sicut definitio Concilii, et liber acceptatus in canonicum, est de fide quod legitimus sit, prout in particulari sic acceptatur. Et quando additur quod non omnes in Ecclesia acceptant hoc tamquam de fide respondetur, quod non omnes acceptant illam propositionem, tamquam materiam de fide quasi speculative, et in actu signato, seu inadæquate illam considerando, existimantes sufficere ad munus pontificum quod morali quadam, aut naturali certitudine habeatur, quod sit pontifex, virtualiter tamen, et in exercitio ipsum cum tota Ecclesia acceptant in regulam supremam fidei hanc personam in particulari. Unde solum ex ignorantia, ut inquit Suarez ubi supra, putant se non credere quod in exercitio, et actu acceptant in regulam fidei, et ita sibi ipsis quasi contradicunt, et corum assertio judicatur a magistro Nugno tamquam temeraria, et proxima errori. Ad id vero, quod objicitur contra tertium modum respondetur, probare quod non solum propter illum modum sit de fide: Hunc hominem esse pontificem, sed etiam ante quamcumque definitionem pontificis per acceptationem pacificam Ecclesiæ circa talem electum: non tamen probat quod nullo magis manifestetur id, et confirmetur quando ipse pontifex aliquid definit, cum posito objecto definito de fide, debeat poni infallibilitas, in ipsa definitione, atque adeo in potestate definiente. |  | **XXXIX.** Response to what has been said. There have been diverse opinions among theologians concerning which of those methods, which are referred to in the argument, it is held as a matter of faith that this particular man is the pontiff. And it has seemed more probable to us that, once the Church has accepted such an election and the elected person, by that very fact it becomes a matter of faith that in particular: This man is the pontiff, although this becomes better known and more manifest when the pontiff himself exercises some act of definition. And when it is said that the Church does not accept that election and the elected person as a matter of faith to be believed, but as a matter of obedience, we have already sufficiently responded above that the Church accepts that matter as pertaining to faith because it accepts him as an infallible rule of faith, which cannot happen unless it is a matter of faith that he who is thus accepted is truly the rule of faith: just as the definition of a Council, and a book accepted as canonical, is a matter of faith that it is legitimate, insofar as it is accepted as such in particular. And when it is added that not all in the Church accept this as a matter of faith, it is answered that not all accept that proposition as a matter of faith quasi-speculatively and as a formal statement, or considering it inadequately, thinking it sufficient for the office of pontiffs that it be held with a certain moral or natural certainty that he is the pontiff; nevertheless, virtually and in practice, they accept him along with the whole Church as the supreme rule of faith, this person in particular. Hence, only out of ignorance, as Suárez says where cited above, do they think they do not believe what in practice and in act they accept as the rule of faith, and thus they contradict themselves, as it were, and their assertion is judged by Master Nuño as rash and proximate to error. To that which is objected against the third method, it is answered that it proves that not only because of that method is it a matter of faith: That this man is the pontiff, but also before any definition by the pontiff through the peaceful acceptance of the Church concerning such an elected person: it does not, however, prove that it is not more clearly manifested and confirmed when the pontiff himself defines something, since when an object defined as a matter of faith is posited, infallibility must be posited in the definition itself, and thus in the defining power. |
| XL. Solum quæres quo tempore incipit ista acceptatio Ecclesiæ ita sufficiens esse, quod reddat illam propositionem de fide, an eo ipso quod cardinales electum proponunt illis fidelibus, qui in tali loco electionis sunt, an quando jam sufficienter id divulgatum est per totum mundum, et Ecclesiam ubicumque diffusam. Respondetur, quod ut supra diximus concors cardinalium electio, et declaratio est quasi definitio facta ab episcopis in Concilio legitime congregato, ipsa vero Ecclesiae acceptatio quoad nos est quasi confirmatio talis declarationis. Intelligitur autem fieri ista acceptatio, tum negative statim dum non contradicit Ecclesia, ubicumque scit talem electionem; tum positive dum ibi statim a praelatis Ecclesiae acceptatur, qui ibi sunt, et paulatim in aliis mundi partibus ab aliis praelatis etiam admittitur, ita quod illi qui vident, aut audiunt papam electum, et ei non contradici, statim tenentur credere illum esse papam, et acceptare illum. |  | **XL.** You will only ask at what time this acceptance by the Church begins to be sufficiently valid so as to render that proposition a matter of faith: whether by the very fact that the Cardinals present the elected person to those faithful who are in the place of election, or when it has already been sufficiently promulgated throughout the whole world and the Church spread everywhere. It is answered that, as we stated above, the unanimous election and declaration by the Cardinals is like a definition made by bishops in a legitimately convened Council, while the acceptance by the Church is, as far as we are concerned, like a confirmation of such declaration. Moreover, this acceptance is understood to occur both negatively—immediately when the Church, wherever it knows of such an election, does not contradict it—and positively when it is immediately accepted by the prelates of the Church who are present there, and gradually in other parts of the world it is also admitted by other prelates, such that those who see or hear of the Pope-elect, and observe that he is not being contradicted, are immediately bound to believe that he is the Pope and to accept him. |
| XLI. Denique ad id quod objicitur de illo syllogismo: Omnis rite electus est pontifex, hic est rite electus, ergo est pontifex, quod illa minor non solum ut conditio se habet, sed ut praemissa influens in conclusionem, etc. respondetur, aliquos ita sentire quod solum influat ut conditio requisita, illam vero propositionem: Hic homo pontifex, ita immediate contineri sub illa universali: Omnis rite electus est pontifex, sicut sub ista: Omnis homo est mortalis, continetur aeque primo de fide, quod: Petrus est mortalis, licet requiratur tamquam conditio quod Petrus sit generatus, et sit homo, quod tamen non de fide constat, sed naturaliter cognoscitur. Mihi autem videtur distinguendum, quod si illa propositio: Hic homo est rite electus per ly rite electus intelligamus non solum electionem rite factam, sed etiam acceptatam in particulari ab Ecclesiæ, esse propositionem de fide: Quod hic homo sit rite electus, sicut est propositio de fide facta definitione a Concilio, quod illa definitio est legitima, et facta approbatione alicujus libri in canonicum est de fide esse approbatum, et esse canonicum, quia acceptatur, ut regula fidei infallibilis : nec ponit in numero : Hic homo est rite electus, et hic homo est pontifex, quia acceptatio in summum pontificem, et esse summum pontificem idem est, sicut rem aliquam esse definitam, et definitionem esse legitimam non ponunt in numero. Si autem per ly rite electus intelligatur esse adhibitas omnes conditiones requisitas, ut electio sit legitima antecedenter ad acceptationem Ecclesiæ, tunc dico esse illam propositionem notatam morali certitudine, et influere in illam veritatem : Hic homo est pontifex, non solum tamquam præmissa inferens, sed tamquam disponens, ut sit pontifex, et acceptetur ut talis, et tunc est sensus : Omnis rite electus est pontifex, id est, omnis qui eligitur cum debitis conditionibus debet acceptari in pontificem, iste sic eligitur; ergo debet acceptari. In primo tamen sensu utraque propositio est de fide, scilicet: Omnis rite electus, et acceptatus est pontifex, hic est rite electus, et acceptatus, etc. ut supra ostensum est. |  | **XLI.** Finally, to the objection raised concerning that syllogism: “Every duly elected person is pontiff; this person is duly elected; therefore, he is pontiff,” where the minor premise functions not only as a condition but as a premise influencing the conclusion, etc., it is answered that some hold the opinion that it influences only as a required condition. They hold that the proposition “This man is pontiff” is contained as immediately under that universal proposition “Every duly elected person is pontiff” as the proposition “Peter is mortal” is contained, equally as a matter of faith, under “Every man is mortal,” although it is required as a condition that Peter be generated and be a man—which, however, is not known by faith but through natural knowledge. It seems to me, however, that a distinction must be made: if by the proposition “This man is duly elected,” we understand through the phrase “duly elected” not only an election properly conducted but also particularly accepted by the Church, then it is a proposition of faith that “This man is duly elected,” just as it is a proposition of faith, once a definition has been made by a Council, that “that definition is legitimate.” And once a book has been approved as canonical, it is a matter of faith that it is approved and is canonical, because it is accepted as an infallible rule of faith. Nor does it create a numerical distinction to say “This man is duly elected” and “This man is pontiff,” because acceptance as supreme pontiff and being supreme pontiff are the same thing—just as something being defined and a definition being legitimate do not constitute a numerical distinction. If, however, by the phrase “duly elected” we understand that all the required conditions have been applied so that the election is legitimate prior to the Church’s acceptance, then I say that proposition is characterized by moral certainty and influences the truth “This man is pontiff,” not only as a premise that infers, but as a disposition for him to be pontiff and to be accepted as such. And then the meaning is: “Every duly elected person is pontiff,” that is, “Everyone who is elected with the proper conditions ought to be accepted as pontiff; this person is so elected; therefore, he ought to be accepted.” In the first sense, however, both propositions are matters of faith, namely: “Everyone duly elected and accepted is pontiff” and “This person is duly elected and accepted,” etc., as shown above. |
| XLII. Ultimo arguitur: Quia illud est de fide immediate, cujus oppositum est manifesta hæresis, sed qui negat hunc hominem non esse papam, non est hæreticus, sed solum schismaticus; ergo qui affirmat ipsum esse papam non assentitur ex fide. Minor patet, nam qui nolunt recognoscere istum hominem tamquam pontificem, et ei denegant obedientiam, sunt schismatici, quia scindunt unitatem Ecclesiæ, seu capitis ejus, non tamen sunt hæretici, alias nunquam schisma ab hæresi differret, cum tamen constet schisma opponi charitati, hæresis fidei, ut docet S. Thomas 2-2,quæst. xxxix, seu paci, quæ est effectus charitatis, semper enim schisma negat hunc in particulari esse papam nolens ei obedire, et aliud caput constituens; si autem esset de fide quod: Hic homo in particulari est pontifex, quicumque illum non recognosceret, sed negaret esse papam, saltem in foro exteriori judicaretur ut hæreticus, quia negaret id quod tenebatur credere tamquam de fide, scilicet quod: Iste homo est papa. |  | **XLII.** Finally, it is argued: Because that is immediately of faith, the opposite of which is manifest heresy. But one who denies that this man is not the pope is not a heretic, but only schismatic; therefore, one who affirms that he is the pope does not assent from faith. The minor premise is evident, for those who refuse to recognize this man as pontiff, and deny him obedience, are schismatics, because they divide the unity of the Church, or of its head, yet they are not heretics. Otherwise, schism would never differ from heresy, although it is established that schism opposes charity, while heresy opposes faith, as St. Thomas teaches in [Summa Theologica] 2-2, question 39, or opposes peace, which is the effect of charity. For schism always denies that this particular individual is pope, refusing to obey him and establishing another head; but if it were a matter of faith that: “This particular man is pontiff,” whoever did not recognize him, but denied him to be pope, would at least in the external forum be judged a heretic, because he would be denying what he was bound to believe as a matter of faith, namely that: “This man is pope.” |
| XLIII. Confirmatur primo, quia modo non est de fide tales homines in particulari fuisse veros, et legitimos pontifices, verbi gratia, Julium II, aut Sixtum IV, sed id habetur ex historiis, quæ numerant illos inter pontifices, et tantum est de fide tunc fuisse veram, et visibilem Ecclesiam; ergo etiam si modo sit de fide, esse veram, et visibilem Ecclesiam in particulari, non est necesse quod sit de fide: Hunc hominem esse pontificem. Quod si semel est de fide, semper erit de fide, aut si modo non est de fide illos in particulari fuisse summos pontifices, neque tunc fuit de fide, quia quod semel de fide est, semper manet de fide. Confirmatur secundo, nam si papa est hæreticus continuo desinit esse papa, et est satis probabile inter catholicos, quod eo ipso quod est hæreticus, desinit esse papa,non per sententiam, aut depositionem Ecclesiæ, sed ex Christo Domini judicio invisibili, sed non est de fide hunc hominem, qui est papa non esse hæreticum; ergo non est de fide ipsum non amittere pontificatum. |  | **XLIII.** This is confirmed, firstly, because it is not now a matter of faith that such men in particular were true and legitimate pontiffs—for example, Julius II or Sixtus IV—but this is established from historical accounts that list them among the pontiffs. It is only a matter of faith that at that time there existed a true and visible Church. Therefore, even if now it is a matter of faith that there exists a true and visible Church in particular, it is not necessary that it be a matter of faith that: “This man is the pontiff.” Because if something is once a matter of faith, it will always remain a matter of faith; or if now it is not a matter of faith that those particular individuals were Supreme Pontiffs, then neither was it a matter of faith then, since what is once a matter of faith always remains a matter of faith. This is confirmed, secondly, because if a pope is a heretic, he immediately ceases to be pope, and it is a sufficiently probable opinion among Catholics that by the very fact that he is a heretic, he ceases to be pope—not through a sentence or deposition by the Church, but by the invisible judgment of Christ the Lord. However, it is not a matter of faith that this man who is pope is not a heretic; therefore, it is not a matter of faith that he does not lose the pontificate. |
| XLIV. Respondetur, quod ille qui negaret hunc hominem esse papam postquam pacifice, et canonice acceptatus est, non solum esset schismaticus, sed etiam hæreticus, non enim solum scinderet unitatem Ecclesiæ sicut illi, qui a principio eligunt duos pontifices, de quibus nescitur quis sit verus pontifex, sed etiam addit perversum dogma, quia negat habendum pro pontifice, et pro regula fidei illum quem Ecclesia acceptavit. Unde in his habet locum id quod docet Hieronymus super caput III ad Titum, et ex illo S. Thomæ 2-2, quæst. XXXIX, art. I ad tertium, quod nullum schisma est quod non sibi aliquam hæresim confingat, ut recte ab Ecclesia recessisse videatur. Itaque licet schisma distinguatur ab hæresi, tamen plerumque cum hæresi conjungitur et parat viam ad illam, et in præsenti qui propositionem illam negaret non esset pure schismaticus, sed etiam hæreticus, quod etiam censet Suarez ubi supra solutione ad quartum. |  | **XLIV.** We respond that whoever would deny this man to be pope after he has been peacefully and canonically accepted, would be not only schismatic but also heretical. For such a person would not merely rend the unity of the Church like those who from the beginning elect two pontiffs (regarding whom it is unknown which is the true pontiff), but would also add a perverse dogma, because he denies that one whom the Church has accepted should be held as pontiff and as the rule of faith. Hence in these matters, that which Jerome teaches in his commentary on the third chapter of Titus applies, and from him St. Thomas in Secunda Secundae, question 39, article 1, ad tertium, that there is no schism which does not fabricate for itself some heresy, so that it might appear to have rightly withdrawn from the Church. Thus, although schism is distinguished from heresy, nevertheless it is most often joined with heresy and prepares the way for it, and in the present case, whoever would deny that proposition would be not purely schismatic, but also heretical, which Suarez also judges in the above-mentioned passage in his response to the fourth objection. |
| XLV. Ad primam confirmationem respondetur, quod de pontificibus antiquis, vel nobis constat fuisse acceptatos ab Ecclesia, quia id vidimus, aut aliqua eorum definitio remansit, in qua declarando aliquid de fide simul declaratum reliquerunt se fuisse regulam fidei; vel nobis non constat de tali acceptatione Ecclesiæ, aut definitione ab ipsis facta. Si nobis constat, eodem modo erit de fide quod illi in particulari fuerint pontifices, sicut modo est de fide quod iste in particulari sit pontifex. Si vero id non constat per accidens non erit de fide quoad nos, sed tantum per historiam humanam id tenebimus, licet enim tunc veram Ecclesiam fuisse constat, tamen per accidens quia non constat de acceptatione facta ab Ecclesia circa illum pontificem in particulari, non credimus de fide illum fuisse papam in particulari; de se tamen est materia de fide quotiescumque ipsa acceptatio Ec-clesiae nobis innotescat, vel aliqua definitio ipsius papae, quae tam-quam effectus infallibilis ipsius de-monstret ipsum, qui definivit vere fuisse papam, sicut credimus hoc vel illud Concilium transactum fuis-se legitimum, quia ejus definitiones acceptamus, et ipsius confirma-tionem videmus. |  | **XLV.** To the first confirmation, we respond that regarding ancient pontiffs, either it is known to us that they were accepted by the Church, because we have seen this, or some of their definitions have remained, in which, while declaring something about faith, they simultaneously left it declared that they were the rule of faith; or it is not known to us about such acceptance by the Church, or about a definition made by them. If it is known to us, then it will be a matter of faith that those particular individuals were pontiffs, just as it is now a matter of faith that this particular person is pontiff. If, however, this is not known, then accidentally it will not be a matter of faith for us, but we will hold it only through human history. For although it is certain that there was a true Church then, nevertheless, accidentally, because the acceptance made by the Church regarding that particular pontiff is not evident to us, we do not believe as a matter of faith that he was the pope in particular. In itself, however, it is a matter of faith whenever the acceptance by the Church becomes known to us, or some definition of the pope himself, which, as an infallible effect, demonstrates that he who defined was truly the pope, just as we believe that this or that past Council was legitimate, because we accept its definitions, and we see its confirmation. |
| XLVI. Ad secundam confirma-tionem respondetur, non debere ad-mitti, quod pontifex hoc ipso quod est haereticus, ante declarationem Ecclesiae desinat esse papa, licet ali-qui id videantur tenere, de quo ar-ticulo sequenti. Quod ergo versatur in opinione est, an facta declara-tione Ecclesiae, quod papa sit haere-ticus deponatur ipso facto a Christo Domino, vel ab Ecclesia debeat fieri depositio. Caeterum antequam Ec-clesia id juridice declaret, semper pro papa est habendus, ut sequenti articulo amplius patebit. |  | **XLVI.** To the second confirmation, it is responded that one should not admit that the pontiff, by the very fact that he is a heretic, ceases to be pope before the declaration of the Church, although some seem to hold this view, which will be addressed in the following article. What remains a matter of opinion is whether, once the Church has made a declaration that the pope is a heretic, he is deposed ipso facto by Christ the Lord, or whether the deposition must be carried out by the Church. Nevertheless, before the Church juridically declares this, he must always be regarded as the pope, as will be more fully explained in the following article. |